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Lawyers, Not Widgets: Why Private-Sector 
Attorneys Must Unionize to Save the 
Legal Profession 
Melissa Mortazavi† 
  INTRODUCTION   
More than two decades ago, Chief Justice Rehnquist la-
mented:  
It seems to me that a law firm that requires an associate to bill in ex-
cess of two thousand hours per year . . . is substantially more con-
cerned with profit-maximization than were firms when I practiced. 
Indeed, one might argue that such a firm is treating the associate 
very much as a manufacturer would treat a purchaser of one hundred 
tons of scrap metal: if you use anything less than the one hundred tons 
that you paid for, you simply are not running an efficient business.1 
Little has changed since; if anything, practicing law as a 
business is now the prevailing norm.2 Work in a firm, particu-
larly “big law,” is often grueling, hierarchical, mind-numbing, 
and, at times, downright dehumanizing.3 In this environment, 
 
†  J.D. University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, incoming Visit-
ing Assistant Professor, Brooklyn Law School. For comments on earlier manu-
scripts, suggestions, and feedback, I would like to thank Britton Schwartz, 
David Ismay, and the faculty at the University of Kansas School of Law. Copy-
right © 2012 by Melissa Mortazavi. 
 1. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Dedicatory Address: The Legal 
Profession Today, Address Before Indiana University School of Law (Sept. 12, 
1986), in 62 IND. L.J. 151, 153 (1987). 
 2. Today, law firms are profit-driven businesses, ranked by profits per 
partner. See, e.g., Rosemarie Clancy & Russell Miskiewicz, Profits Show a 
Healthy Increase, AM. LAW., May 2011, at 139, 139–40. Rankings according to 
gross revenue and revenue per lawyer are also available. Rosemarie Clancy & 
Russell Miskiewicz, Seventeen Firms Gross More Than $1 Billion, AM. LAW., 
May 2011, at 121, 121–29; Rosemarie Clancy & Russell Miskiewicz, The Har-
binger of a Recovery?, AM. LAW., May 2011, at 131, 131–37. 
 3. One law firm partner argued that the current billable hour system 
renders associates “as interchangeable as widgets.” Niki Kuckes, The Hours: 
The Short, Unhappy History of How Lawyers Bill Their Clients, LEGAL AFF. 
Sept.–Oct. 2002, at 40, 40, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/ 
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attorneys are often overtired,4 under informed about their cas-
es, and afraid of appearing weak or incapable to superiors.5 
Understandably, these attorneys are frequently unable to per-
form to the best of their abilities or to exercise good independ-
ent judgment.6 The scope of the problem takes on larger and 
darker dimensions when unhappy or stressed lawyers become 
ethical liabilities.7 In adopting an increasingly profit-driven 
business model that mirrors that of their clients,8 lawyers have 
adopted a model that is fundamentally at odds with their pro-
fessional obligations.9 Although the legal profession attempts to 
compensate for these tensions through increasingly detailed 
ethical rules, the fact remains that workplace mistreatment of 
lawyers creates a system that marginalizes professional  
responsibility. 
This Article argues that labor issues and ethical issues in 
the legal profession are inherently intertwined. Despite the 
widespread acknowledgment of tensions between how private 
 
September-October-2002/review_kuckes_sepoct2002.msp; see also Eli Wald, 
Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, 
and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2245, 2283 (2010) (arguing that the emphasis on “around-the-clock commit-
ment to the firm” exacerbates already prevalent stereotypes regarding the fe-
male lawyer’s inherent under-commitment to the firm). 
 4. See Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby: Empirical Data on 
the Problems and Pressure Points, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171, 182 (2005) (re-
porting that 3% of surveyed attorneys sleep less than five hours per night and 
35.7% sleep five to six hours per night). 
 5. See Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the 
Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. 
REV. 705, 743 (1998) (arguing that young attorneys do not receive the oppor-
tunity to “slowly learn their craft” and instead are pressured to “hit the 
ground running”). 
 6. See Fortney, supra note 4 (concluding that overtired attorneys may 
not be operating at “peak performance”). 
 7. Claude Solnik, Stressed-out, Overworked Lawyers Lead to Disciplinary 
Actions by State Bar, ALLBUSINESS (Aug. 19, 2005), http://www.allbusiness 
.com/north-america/united-states-new-york/1083441-1.html (reporting on the 
correlation between stress and overwork on the ethical practice of lawyering in 
terms of client availability, substantive work product, judgment, and financial 
integrity). 
 8. See David B. Wilkins, Partner Shmartner! EEOC v. Sidley Austin 
Brown and Wood, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1264, 1273 (2007) (noting that “[t]he pre-
vailing wisdom is that only ‘business-like’ firms that successfully organize 
themselves in ways that parallel their business clients will survive in today’s 
competitive marketplace”). 
 9. See Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 154 (“[E]thical considerations . . . are 
factors which counsel against maximization of income in the best Adam Smith 
tradition . . . .”). 
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practice is conducted and the values lawyers hold,10 the issue of 
how to remedy legal ethics is misunderstood and often analyzed 
on a rule-by-rule basis. This approach avoids the core of the 
problem, which is systemic and, thus, requires a systemic  
solution.  
The first innovation of this Article is to import and apply 
new institutionalism,11 a theory widely used in economics and 
political science, to legal practice. Applying this theory to law 
reveals that the ethical crisis at the heart of the current private 
practice system is an institutional and systemic flaw. The inev-
itable tension between the conscious acts (or inaction) of indi-
vidual lawyers and the institutional norms of private practice 
that facilitate unethical behavior has led to an ethical crisis. By 
approaching these circumstances from a new institutionalist 
perspective, one can begin to craft meaningful and workable so-
lutions to restore professionalism, agency, and integrity to the 
legal workplace. The question changes from, “how can individ-
ual lawyers act ethically?” to “how do lawyers change firms as 
institutions to support or compel ethical behavior?”  
This Article further argues that only a structural change in 
firm institutions—a seismic shift—can reorder the legal work-
place into one conducive to professionally responsible practice. 
Past solutions—such as piecemeal amendments to the Ameri-
can Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Mod-
el Rules),12 or relying on firms and individuals to self-police—
are ineffective. Similarly, banishing the billable hour is neither 
pragmatic nor likely. Agreements between lawyers regarding 
 
 10. See generally Fortney, supra note 4, at 178 (discussing how high billa-
ble hour requirements may incentivize inefficiency and dishonest time rec-
ords); Robert E. Hirshon, Law and the Billable Hour: A Standard Developed in 
the 1960s May Be Damaging Our Profession, 88 A.B.A. J. 10, 10 (2002) (“Men-
toring, life-balance, workplace stimulation and innovation are affected when 
the timesheet reigns.”). 
 11. See generally Thomas A. Koelble, The New Institutionalism in Politi-
cal Science and Sociology, 27 COMP. POL. 231, 232 (1995) (describing various 
forms of new institutionalism, but acknowledging that they all “share a con-
cern for the role of institutions in social science”). 
 12. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT (2010). The Model 
Rules devote an entire section to decoding the basic principles of professional 
responsibility in the context of a law firm. See id. R. 5.1–5.8. This alone recog-
nizes the innate difficulty and quagmire of ethical contortions that the bar 
must go through in order to facilitate law practiced in firms. But the fact is, 
improved working conditions for the attorneys practicing at law firms would 
do more to ameliorate ethical issues than creating complex rules. Improved 
working conditions would attack the root of the problem and the structure of 
legal work at firms.  
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pay are antitrust violations.13 Labor discussions between indi-
vidual lawyers and their firms reveal extreme leverage inequal-
ities, lack enforceability, and are subject to client and economic 
pressures to be competitive with other firms. As such, this Arti-
cle proposes the most effective remaining alternative: private-
sector attorneys must unionize, not only to change their own 
lives and working conditions, but to uphold their ethical obliga-
tions as lawyers.  
Unionization is the only option that will allow private-
sector attorneys the ability to transcend the institutional norms 
of firms and neutralize some of the market forces at play in the 
current system. Any change to firm labor practices needs to be 
relatively uniform across firms because: (1) clients may shop 
around for firms that are more willing to exploit labor or that 
are nonparticipants in informal labor agreements; (2) even 
were this not the case, the threat of losing clients will prevent 
partners from supporting labor changes unless competitors are 
bound to the same terms; and (3) if all attorneys in the sector 
are bound by the same general terms of employment then how 
law is practiced will change—partners will have leverage to 
“push back” on clients, the government, and potential adver-
saries for things like reasonable work deadlines. Unionization 
legally allows attorneys across firms to make the demands nec-
essary to reform the profession and empowers associates, staff 
attorneys and partners to fundamentally change how private 
law is practiced. Time management, good decision making and 
prioritization, and quality over quantity become the central fo-
cuses of effective practice.  
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I applies the theo-
ry of new institutionalism to law firms and reframes longstand-
ing and emerging ethical and labor issues embedded in firms’ 
current work structures. Part II outlines in greater detail the 
specific ethical rules undermined by current firm practices. 
Part III discusses other possible solutions to the ethical issues 
presented and concludes that non-unionization options are ille-
gal, limited, or ineffective. Lastly, Part IV outlines the legality 
and ethics of unionization for attorneys and concludes that un-
ionization is the best way to address the ethical and labor is-
sues pertaining to private-sector lawyers.  
 
 13. See infra Part III.E (discussing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court 
Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990)).  
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I.  NEW INSTITUTIONALISM AND THE STRUCTURE OF 
THE MODERN LAW FIRM   
A. THE THEORY: NEW INSTITUTIONALISM  
“In the majority of situations, rules and procedures (that is, 
institutions) are clearly established, and individuals follow rou-
tines. They follow well-worn paths and do what they think is 
expected of them.”14 
The theory of “new institutionalism,” frequently applied in 
modern economics, political science, and sociology, provides an 
important framework for understanding why lawyers at law 
firms do not, and will not, change their working conditions as 
individuals despite the obvious negative ethical implications of 
their work structure.15 Broadly speaking, new institutionalism 
conceptualizes institutions not as specific groups of people or 
physical places, but as dynamic sets of formal and informal 
rules.16 These rules may take the form of behaviors, customs, 
symbols, patterns of thought, or conventional wisdom.17 New 
institutionalism posits that, whatever form they take, these 
rules frame—or supersede—conscious decision making and 
structure human interactions.18 Under this theory, institutions 
 
 14. Koelble, supra note 11, at 233.  
 15. There are three branches of new institutionalism: rational choice, his-
torical, and sociological. This Article will focus on the sociological branch of 
new institutionalism. For discussion of the distinctions, see generally Peter A. 
Hall & Rosemary C. R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institu-
tionalisms, 44 POL. STUD. 936, 950–55 (1996) (discussing strengths and weak-
nesses of the three types of new institutionalism); Koelble, supra note 11 
(identifying major differences between rational choice, historical, and sociolog-
ical new institutionalism).  
 16. See B. GUY PETERS, INSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE: 
THE “NEW INSTITUTIONALISM” 28–29 (1999); Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. 
Powell, Introduction to THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL 
ANALYSIS 1, 1–3 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991). 
 17. See JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITU-
TIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 22 (1989) (“By ‘rules’ we mean 
the routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organizational forms, 
and technologies around which political activity is constructed.”). 
 18. See WENDELL GORDON, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: THE CHANGING 
SYSTEM 16 (1980) (“[A]n institution is a grouping of people with some common 
behavior patterns, its members having an awareness of the grouping. But in 
this definition the emphasis is on the institutional behavior pattern. It is not 
especially helpful to reify institutions in the sense of thinking of them as 
buildings or groups of people. . . . So, the essence of the institutions is the 
commonly held behavior pattern.”); Thráinn Eggertsson, A Note on the Eco-
nomics of Institutions, in EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 6, 6–
7 (Lee J. Alston et al. eds., 1996) (asserting that institutional rules “shape 
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matter because “they shape, even determine, human behavior. 
Institutions come about to give legitimacy to rules of conduct 
and behavior which concern power relations and the establish-
ment of social and cultural norms . . . .”19 Institutions keep in-
dividual actors behaving a certain way through various mecha-
nisms of control: hierarchies, sanctions, rewards, rules, and 
procedures.20 A law firm is an institution, replete with its own 
set of norms, beliefs, and practices that are self-reinforcing and 
are not imposed or enforced by any one individual.21  
The institution of the modern law firm did not develop in a 
vacuum. Rather, it was “created or adopted in a world already 
replete with institutions.”22 Because “developing new institu-
tions ‘borrow’ from the existing world of institutional tem-
plates,”23 law firms internalized the business models of their 
successful clients, and adopted a sort of Wall Street ethos.24 For 
lawyers this is a problematic development, since the institu-
tional structure of Wall Street cannot safeguard the duties as 
lawyers. Unlike their Wall Street clients, lawyers are bound by 
demanding and highly codified rules of professional responsibil-
ity and ethics that are incompatible with unmitigated profit 
 
human interaction”); James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institution-
alism: Organizational Factors in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 736 
(1984). 
 19. Koelble, supra note 11 (describing the work of MARCH & OLSEN, supra 
note 17, at 23–24).  
 20. See Ellen M. Immergut, The Theoretical Core of the New Institutional-
ism, 26 POL. & SOC’Y 5, 5, 16 (1998), available at http://pas.sagepub.com/ 
content/26/1/5.full.pdf+html (arguing that “decisions cannot be understood as 
macro-aggregations of individual preferences but instead result from cognitive 
and organizational procedures that produce decisions despite uncertainty”); 
Koelble, supra note 11, at 233 (describing the way that individual actors are 
“kept in line”). 
 21. For example, some typical norms in the law firm are: to place firm 
work above all other obligations, not to refuse additional work, not to report 
poor judgment or behavior on the part of anyone in the firm to a superior or 
parties outside the firm, to seek to maximize billable hours, to file every possi-
ble motion, to conduct extensive document review immediately—before being 
able to target key issues—and expect immediate around-the-clock responses 
using mobile devices. See infra Part I.B.1–3. 
 22. Hall & Taylor, supra note 15, at 953.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America’s Governing Class: The For-
mation and Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Law-
yer’s Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 381 (2001) (discussing a shift 
from conceptualizing being a lawyer as being a “guardian of the law” to a 
“hired gun”).  
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maximization.25 Beyond formal rules of ethics, lawyers also play 
a broader role in safeguarding the rule of law.26 These distinc-
tions are part of what makes lawyers critical actors in civil so-
ciety.27 By continuously asking attorneys to work under sub-par 
conditions where they lack agency or are treated without re-
spect, the institution of the firm fundamentally undermines the 
ability of a lawyer to be a lawyer, a professional, and, ultimate-
ly, a responsible advocate.  
So how does one change an institution with deeply in-
grained norms, where individual actors are structurally con-
strained? “Organizations are characterized by their use of job 
specification and division of labor;” as such, the structure of la-
bor is pivotal in maintaining an institution’s hold over individ-
ual actors.28 Thus, a labor reform results in institutional reform 
by providing new opportunities for individual action.29  
B. THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE MODERN LAW FIRM 
1. The Players 
The basic structure of the attorney workforce at a law firm 
is a simple hierarchy: at the top are partners, who have equity; 
then associates, who potentially could join the partnership 
ranks;30 then staff attorneys, who do rote, repetitive work that 
associates dislike,31 and for which clients hate to pay top dol-
 
 25. Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discard-
ing Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 
70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1231–33 (1995) (concluding a middle-ground approach 
that would continue bar admission while permitting nonlawyers to practice 
law and substituting market and government regulation for self-regulation of 
legal ethics is a viable alternative to standing models of practice). Even legal 
scholars arguing in favor of a “business paradigm” of practice do not advocate 
for a simple market based system. Id.  
 26. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 6 (2010) (“[A] lawyer 
should further the public’s understanding of and confidence in the rule of law 
and the justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy 
depend on popular participation and support to maintain their authority.”). 
 27. See Professionalism Symposium, 52 S.C. L. REV. 443, 490 (2001). 
 28. Koelble, supra note 11, at 233. 
 29. The very act of unionization breaks with current (unspoken) norms. 
Despite the fact that attorneys play a vital role in the private sector, there has 
not been serious consideration to date on unionization of the attorney workforce.  
 30. See generally MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF 
LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 2–3 (1991) ( listing the 
dichotomy between partners and associates as one of the distinctive features of 
the big law firm). 
 31. See Peter D. Sherer & Kyungmook Lee, Institutional Change in Large 
Law Firms: A Resource Dependency and Institutional Perspective, 45 ACAD. 
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lar;32 and, at the bottom, contract attorneys, who are temporari-
ly employed by firms on an ad hoc basis depending on a given 
matter.33 Generally speaking, partners are completely at the 
disposal of clients and provide round-the-clock responsiveness, 
regardless of whether they are on vacation, or even giving 
birth.34 Associates face other labor issues, like physically gruel-
ing travel, excessive and irregular hours, routine sleep depriva-
tion, unclear advancement policies, and no formal layoff or job 
severance policy.35  
Staff and contract attorneys have even less leverage and, 
by no coincidence, have the longest list of workplace grievances. 
In addition to the issues plaguing associates, staff and contract 
attorneys face compensation issues, lack of paid leave,36 poor or 
 
MGMT. J. 102, 107 (2002) (describing staff attorneys as non-partnership track 
attorneys hired to perform “routine price sensitive work”). 
 32. Jonathan D. Glater, Billable Hours Giving Ground at Law Firms, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, at A1. 
 33. “Contract attorneys” are essentially freelance attorneys who come in 
on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, often to engage in document review. They 
may work completely on their own. Alternatively, in the context of big cities, it 
is more likely that they come from large agencies. For example, Black Letter 
Discovery provides staff for document review, review facilities, management, 
and onshore review in eight U.S. cities. Discovery Services, BLACK LETTER 
DISCOVERY, http://www.blackletterdiscovery.com/services/discovery_services.php 
( last visited Apr. 16, 2012); Locations, BLACK LETTER DISCOVERY, http://www 
.blackletterdiscovery.com/about/bld_locations.php ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012). 
 34. Some law firm partners respond via blackberry even during labor. See 
Judith S. Kaye, Women Lawyers in Big Firms: A Study in Progress Toward 
Gender Equality, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 121 (1988). 
 35. See infra Part I.C. 
 36. Select agencies do provide benefits to workers. Benefits, COUNS. ON 
CALL, http://www.counseloncall.com/Page/Benefits ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012) 
(providing health benefits, holiday pay, 401(k) plans, and workers compensa-
tion insurance); Frequently Asked Questions/Attorneys, AXIOM LAW, 
http://www.axiomlaw.com/index.php/whoweare/faq ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012) 
(providing “health, vision, dental and malpractice insurance,” among other 
benefits). However, these agencies do not view themselves as “staffing compa-
nies” providing contract attorneys, but rather, as boutique flexible firms offer-
ing the services of a variety of elite practitioners. See, e.g., Counsel on Call, 
COUNS. ON CALL, http://www.counseloncall.com//images/upload/File/counsel-on 
-call-fact-sheet_09.2011.pdf ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012); Frequently Asked Ques-
tions/Attorneys, supra. Note that both Counsel on Call and Axiom Law are 
highly selective companies which pride themselves on providing “experts” in 
the field that they are called on. This is not an option for inexperienced attor-
neys. See Frequently Asked Questions/Attorneys, supra. (“Nearly 75% [of Axi-
om attorneys] come from a top 25 school, most have worked at an AmLaw 50 
or Magic Circle firm and about two-thirds have spent several years in-house 
before joining the firm.”).  
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unsafe working conditions, and even less job security.37 For ex-
perienced attorneys with highly sought after skill sets, being a 
contract attorney once appeared to be a way to more favorably 
manage work-life balance during boom times.38 However, for 
many recent law graduates, who have no work experience, con-
tract work through an agency is viewed as a necessary evil to 
get experience and build a network.39  
2. Basis of Employment: Contracts 
In terms of binding obligations, law firms generally do not 
require or allow associates to sign employment contracts with 
the firm. Thus, the terms of employment are fluid, with few 
written rules or policies regarding job security. Lawyers at 
firms, like most employees, work at will. This means that they 
can be fired with or without cause and without any notice, pro-
vided their termination is not otherwise unlawful.40 One of the 
few exceptions to this rule is that an employer may not termi-
nate an attorney’s employment for insisting that the firm fulfill 
its obligation to report another attorney’s misconduct.41  
3. How Work Is Accomplished: Billing Structures  
At the core of the labor structure of the modern law firm is 
the billable hour. Put simply, lawyers bill clients by how much 
time they spend on a matter, rather than billing clients a set 
 
 37. Julie Kay, Contract Lawyers: Cheaper by the Hour, NAT’L L.J. (Jan. 12, 
2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?id=1202427395994 (report-
ing on the constricting job market, poor working conditions, and pressure to de-
crease wages). 
 38. Hannah Hayes, Lawyer for Hire: Freelance Contractors Change the 
Marketplace, 17 PERSP. 12, 12 (2009), available at http://www.americanbar 
.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/perspectives_magazine/women_perspectives_
Winter09_Freelance_Contractors.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 39. Id. at 13 (“In tough economic times, many law students sign up with 
agencies to gain experience and network.”).  
 40. Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 312 F. Supp. 1105, 1105–07 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970) (ruling that, absent a state action or membership in a union, the Legal 
Aid Society could fire lawyers employed at will in response to speech); Horn v. 
N.Y. Times, 790 N.E.2d 753, 755, 759 (N.Y. 2003) (explaining that an employ-
er may discharge an employee “without cause or notice” so long as it does not 
violate some statutory right or contract).  
 41. Wieder v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 628, 638–39 (N.Y. 1992); see also Connolly 
v. Napoli, Kaiser & Bern L.L.P., 817 N.Y.S.2d 872, 877–78 (Sup. Ct. 2006) 
(holding that an associate fired for refusing to violate DR 1-102, which impos-
es an obligation on attorneys not to engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or mis-
representation, stated a cause of action for breach of implied contract).  
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fee per matter or by outcome.42 Billable hours include only 
minutes billed directly to clients and not time spent on educa-
tion programs, bar work, general firm activities, or simple daily 
acts like lunch.43 Time in the private sector is usually measured 
and billed in six minute intervals, most commonly by using 
electronic trackers on computers.44 Making money under this 
model is simple—more hours worked means more money 
earned by the firm. 
Much scholarly and professional debate has centered on 
the ethics of the billable hour, and whether the billable hour is 
a per se ethics violation remains an open debate.45 Regardless, 
the implementation of the billable hour has, in practice, become 
a facilitator for unethical behavior.46 Particularly when employ-
ee leverage is low and hour maximization is sought without fac-
tors that limit how and when those hours are attained, the eth-
ical practice of law is jeopardized.47 This is because without 
increased leverage, lawyers who are fearful of losing their live-
lihood simply do not pull the institutional weight to counter the 
systemic billing and client pressures. Ultimately, as long as 
there is no penalty, and only benefit, to taking more time to do 
a task, attorneys will abuse the billable hour system. As such, 
the billable hour needs strict restrictions in order to avoid its 
misuse.  
 
 42. A.B.A. COMM’N ON BILLABLE HOURS, ABA COMMISSION ON BILLABLE 
HOURS REPORT 2001–2002 at 45 (2002), available at http://www 
.judicialaccountability.org/articles/ABABillableHours2002.pdf. 
 43. Pro bono work is a gray area where firms differ in their approaches. 
For the years of 2009 and 2010, eighty percent of firms reported counting some 
pro bono work towards billable hour requirements. A Look at Associate Hours 
and at Law Firm Pro Bono Programs: NALP Bulletin, NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. 
PLACEMENT, tbl.4 (Apr. 2010), http://www.nalp.org/july2009hoursandprobono. 
At over forty percent of firms, there is a maximum number of “billable” hours 
an associate may earn towards their quota from pro bono work. Id. tbl.5. The 
average number of pro bono hours credited in these years was just over seven-
ty-two. Id. tbl.6. Under this model, law firms disregard any additional pro bo-
no hours over the maximum number for the purposes of billable hours. Id. 
 44. Maxwell S. Kennerly, Sound and Fury over Flat Fees, Signifying Noth-
ing, LITIG. & TRIAL (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.litigationandtrial.com/2011/ 
01/articles/the-business-of-law/the-long-view/sound-and-fury-over-flat-fees 
-signifying-nothing/. 
 45. See, e.g., Scott Turow, The Billable Hour Must Die, 93 A.B.A. J. 32, 
34–35 (2007), available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_ 
billable_hour_must_die/. 
 46. A.B.A. COMM’N ON BILLABLE HOURS, supra note 42, at 53. 
 47. Id. 
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C. TENSION BETWEEN QUALITY AND QUANTITY 
Robert Hirshon, the former President of the American Bar 
Association, observed, “[t]he billable hour is fundamentally 
about quantity over quality, repetition over creativity.”48 Not 
surprisingly, then, the labor structure that has emerged from 
the unchecked use of the billable hour is one that places over-
whelming incentives on attorneys as individuals to maximize 
the hours they and the firm bill.  
As a matter of course, most law firms have a “billable 
hours target” or “requirement” that sets forth how many hours 
firm attorneys should bill in a given year.49 This target and the 
amount associates bill are usually integral to compensation 
(through the bonus structure) and performance evaluations.50 
The billable system “creat[es] a pecking order among lawyers, 
identifying the best as the busiest and the most costly.”51 In 
1958, the ABA’s target work year was 1300 hours of work for 
attorneys.52 This equated to less than five to six billable hours 
in day, five days a week in a forty-eight week year.53 As of 2001, 
that amount has ballooned by 1000 hours a year, with the ABA 
recommending work hour expectations of 2300 hours annually, 
1900 of which would be billable.54 Those expectations are con-
servative when compared to practice; many law firms require 
between 1900 and 2200 billable hours a year.55  
 
 48. Hirshon, supra note 10. 
 49. A.B.A. COMM’N ON BILLABLE HOURS, supra note 42. While partners 
are not usually subject to hard hours targets, they are under considerable 
pressure to bring in as much money as possible. Therefore, cases that will be 
hour intensive (such as matters involving heavy document discovery) weigh 
heavily in comparison to standard or smaller matters. Partners are also under 
pressure to bill directly, which contributes to their overall financial worth to 
the firm. Id. at 43.  
 50. Fortney, supra note 4, at 175. 
 51. Glater, supra note 32. 
 52. Ronda Muir, A Short History of the Billable Hour and the Consequenc-
es of Its Tyranny, LAW PEOPLE (June 18, 2007), http://www.lawpeopleblog 
.com/2007/06/articles/profitability/a-short-history-of-the-billable-hour-and-the 
-consequences-of-its-tyranny/. 
 53. Id. This is based on the assumption that all 1300 hours recommended 
by the ABA in 1958 would be billable under today’s standards. Id. 
 54. A.B.A. COMM’N ON BILLABLE HOURS, supra note 42, at 50. These hours 
would be “composed of 1900 hours billable to clients plus a total of 400 addi-
tional hours for: firm service (100 hours), pro bono (100 hours), client devel-
opment (75 hours), training and professional development (75 hours) 
and professional service (50 hours).” Muir, supra note 52.  
 55. Fortney, supra note 4, at 175; Kuckes, supra note 3, at 41 (reporting 
that required billable hours in 2001 were 1950–2000 hours per year on aver-
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Because many activities do not count towards billable 
hours requirements, it is commonly estimated that three hours 
of work time roughly equates to two hours of billable time.56 
Therefore, to bill 2000 hours in a year, a typical lawyer will 
need to work 3000 hours.57 A simple calculation reveals that the 
system, as it stands, expects law firm associates to work twelve 
to fourteen hour days consistently throughout the year.58 Two 
thousand hours is hardly the upper limit in the profession, as 
lawyers in big cities admit to billing upwards of 3000 hours in a 
given year.59 This equates to an inhuman twelve hours a day, 
seven days a week, or a seventeen hour workday over a five-day 
workweek.60 
With such enormous labor requirements, the incentive to 
be inefficient, inflate hours, and cut participation in profession-
al activities is obvious.61 Indeed, an associate has no incentive 
to work efficiently because when work is finished quickly it is 
only replaced with more work to continue to maximize hours. 
In order to have time to sleep or to maintain a personal life—let 
alone have time to enjoy a weekend or vacation—law firm law-
 
age); Robert Lennon, The Memo Heard Round the World, AM. LAW., Dec. 2002, 
at 19 (confirming with a Clifford Chance representative that the firm set a 
2200 hour “target,” while encouraging associates to spend time outside client 
billable hours); Memorandum from Clifford Chance Associates to Clifford 
Chance Parnters, (Oct. 15, 2002), available at http://www.lawcost.com/ 
clifchancememo.htm (reporting that Clifford Chance required 2200 hours of 
“hard billable” work and 220 hours of “soft billable” time); Number of Associate 
Hours Worked Declines, NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. PLACEMENT, tbl.3 (Feb. 2011), 
http://www.nalp.org/assoc_hrs_feb2011 (reporting that a 2007 NALP study re-
ported that over sixty percent of law firms require 1900 billable hours or more 
of work per year).  
 56. Kuckes, supra note 3, at 42 (citing the 2:3 ratio); William G. Ross, 
Kicking the Unethical Billing Habit, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2199, 2203 (1998) 
(noting experts approximate one-third of office time is “typically consumed by 
non-billable activities”); Muir, supra note 52 (explaining that the standard 
guideline is that it takes “approximately 10–12 hours to bill 8 hours”).  
 57. Kuckes, supra note 3, at 42. 
 58. See id. These numbers are based on a five-day workweek with forty-
eight weeks per year and are rounded to the nearest whole hour. Id.  
 59. Glater, supra note 32, at A18.  
 60. Id. The phrase “five-day work week” is laughable amongst law firm 
associates who rarely spend an entire weekend not working. See Kuckes, su-
pra note 3, at 42. 
 61. Kuckes, supra note 3 (“The standard [of using quantity of time worked 
over quality of output] invites inefficiency, not to mention fraud.”); Rehnquist, 
supra note 1.  
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yers must find ways to bill more time in less time.62 This starts 
with what may seem like relatively innocent multitasking or 
time management techniques to maximize the number of hours 
billed. But these practices can easily escalate to outright 
fraud.63 Common examples of this problem include: reading, ed-
iting, or responding to emails while commuting; doing work for 
client A while billing travel time for client B; responding or re-
viewing work via mobile device for client A while in a team 
meeting for client B; being on a call for client A while doing 
computer-based research, document review, or writing for cli-
ent B.64 Furthermore, because each individual lawyer is con-
stantly multitasking in an attempt to find enough hours in the 
day, they cannot be focused lawyers; their work will inevitably 
suffer in both content and judgment. However poor the work 
product, it still counts towards billable hours, though. To catch 
the errors arising out of such an arrangement, firms build in 
substantial redundancies.65  
No party, even at the top, escapes the institutional pres-
sure to bill and the fear of losing client work. Partners them-
selves have been found guilty of fraud, disbarred, or resigned 
over bill padding.66 Partners must increase revenue in order to 
increase firm rankings,67 maintain client relations,68 secure 
 
 62. See Fortney, supra note 4, at 177–78 (discussing how associates are 
rewarded for billing more time and how sources in a NALP survey regarded 
bill padding as widespread).  
 63. See Ross, supra note 56, at 2204–05. 
 64. Id. In addition, since the minimal interval for billing a client is six 
minutes, attorneys may make several very short phone calls for different cli-
ents, counting each as a full six minutes. Some parties take to writing down 
their time manually, rather than using the electronic timer, which makes 
their time accumulate faster. At a minimum, they are recording time by the 
minute, not the second, and at maximum, this method encourages rounding 
errors. See Douglas R. Richmond, The New Law Firm Economy, Billable 
Hours, and Professional Responsibility, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 207, 228 (2000). 
 65. See Richmond, supra note 64, at 230–33. Very little written or pro-
duced at a firm is the product of any one person—on the contrary, many peo-
ple and hundreds of hours are devoted to reviewing and revising any given 
document. Id.  
 66. Kuckes, supra note 3, at 42 (noting that partners at Rose Law Firm; 
McDermott, Will & Emery; Latham & Watkins; Mayer, Brown & Platt; and 
Hunton & Williams have all engaged in corrupt billing practices). 
 67. See Rosemarie Clancy & Russell Miskiewicz, Profits Show a Healthy 
Increase, AM. LAW., May 2011, at 139, 139–40. (indicating that big law firms 
are ranked, at least in part, by profits per partner).  
 68. It is a common perception that firm rankings factor heavily into client 
decisions on representation in “bet the company” scenarios, so no law firm 
wants to step out of the rat race. See, e.g., Sheila Livadas, Opinions Mixed on 
 2012] ATTORNEY UNIONS AND PROFESSIONALISM 1495 
 
their own job stability,69 pay firm costs,70 and receive better 
compensation.71 As such, they have few incentives to push back 
on unreasonable client demands or expectations. Although 
partners can be hit hardest by general pressures in the legal 
services industry—particularly in terms of client responsive-
ness—they also feel powerless to change the current system of 
mounting hours, billing pressures, twenty-four-hour availabil-
ity, and quantity of work over quality.72 
Billable time is inflated not by any one of these actions, but 
by its collective impact on firm culture.73 It is the institutional 
practice created by the combination of internal and external 
pressures on firm lawyers that waylays ethical practice. Law 
firm culture has few, if any, checks on the amount of time a 
person can bill in a given day or week.74 Firm norms place little 
relative value on the exercise of skill, individual action, or crea-
tivity. Because law firms pride themselves on being “client 
driven,” an outside agent is viewed as controlling the terms of 
work, giving the institution its own life and trajectory, and ab-
solving individuals of both agency and culpability. The norms 
and practices in the industry leave individuals feeling power-
less within their field of influence. For example, associates feel 
unable to change their team or firm dynamics, and partners 
 
Local Impact of Magazine Law-Firm Rankings, ROCHESTER BUS. J. (Apr. 30, 
2010), http://www.rbj.net/print_article.asp?aID=183880. 
 69. See Julie Creswell & Karen Donovan, Happy Birthday. Vacate Your 
Office, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2006, at C1.  
 70. Partners often blame the pressure to bill on rising associate salaries. 
See Fortney, supra note 4, at 172.  
 71. Recent trends indicate that law firms have moved away from lockstep 
models of compensation—where compensation increases with seniority—and 
turned to models based on other factors, particularly income generated for the 
firm. Leaving Lockstep: Moving Toward Competency-Based Compensation, AM. 
LAW INST.-AM. BAR ASS’N (July 29, 2009), http://www.ali-aba.org/index.cfm? 
fuseaction=courses.course&course_code=RWRM01. 
 72. Kuckes, supra note 3 (“The benefits of seniority rarely include the op-
portunity to work less—only the most successful rainmakers are exempt from 
the pressure to bill time. . . . ‘It’s like a pie-eating contest where first prize is 
all the pie you can eat.’”).  
 73. Cf. Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Mem-
ber of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 
871, 910–15 (1999) (describing big firm culture that challenges the ethical 
practice of law). 
 74. But see Kay Holmen, The 95-Hour Day—Or the Need for Billing Scru-
tiny, KNAPP PETERSEN CLARKE (Spring 2006), http://www.kpclegal.com/ 
publications/billing-scrutiny.php (noting that “most billing programs have au-
tomatic safeguards which will not allow a timekeeper to bill more than 24 
hours a day”). 
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feel powerless in the greater legal market versus other firms.75 
Despite the obvious downfalls of the current system, “law firms 
seem to have neither the ability nor the will” to change.76 
D. OTHER CULTURAL FACTORS 
Several other common practices create an institutional cul-
ture at modern law firms that undermines ethical behavior. For 
example, norms regarding the importance of hierarchy,77 work-
er fungibility,78 a lack of transparency in cases,79 pride in ex-
treme overwork,80 and passive aggressive management all con-
verge to create a poor working environment for lawyers—and 
poor lawyers for clients. Indeed, sleep deprivation is often 
borne with grudging pride as it provides the illusion of being 
important or indispensable.81 These may seem like flexible 
norms, but they are not. Every lawyer at a firm knows that he 
or she needs to follow the chain of command. Every big law as-
sociate knows that he or she may be fired at any time and that 
his or her chances of joining the partnership are low.82 Some 
argue that lawyers in this context function as little more than 
 
 75. Partners recognize the ethical tensions at play in this system but are 
equally trapped by the institutional pressures placed on their roles. See Fort-
ney, supra note 4, at 179 n.35 (citing comments by a Chicago partner stating, 
“I think the profession would be better served and I think clients would be bet-
ter served if [tying salaries to mandatory annual hours’ requirements] became 
an unethical practice”). 
 76. Kuckes, supra note 3, at 43. 
 77. Erin J. Cox, Comment, An Economic Crisis is a Terrible Thing to 
Waste: Reforming the Business of a Law for a Sustainable and Competitive Fu-
ture, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 511, 529 (2009). 
 78. Id. at 513. 
 79. See, e.g., id. at 548–49 (discussing how increased transparency bene-
fits clients). 
 80. See, e.g., Career Center Survey Results: Who Worked on Thanksgiving 
Day?, ABOVE THE LAW (Dec. 1, 2011, 5:22 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2011/ 
12/career-center-survey-results-who-worked-on-thanksgiving-day/ (noting per-
centages of attorneys who worked on various holidays, including a noteworthy 
seventy-three percent of attorneys who worked on Presidents’ Day). 
 81. Cynthia Hsu, Some Busy Lawyers Sleeping in on Site, Japanese-Style 
Sleeping Pods, FindLaw (Aug. 8, 2011, 8:29 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/ 
greedy_associates/2011/08/some-busy-lawyers-sleeping-in-on-site-japanese-style 
-sleeping-pods.html. 
 82. Cf. Julie Kay, Making Partner Gets Tougher, LAW.COM (Sept. 29, 
2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202517268513&slreturn=1 (de-
scribing more obstacles to making partner). 
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paralegals, and that a law degree, while nice, is not strictly  
required.83  
Under this model, the client hires the partner and is rela-
tively uninvolved in the subsequent staffing. It is often taken 
as a given that individual attorneys will not know the overall 
strategy for the cases they are assigned to, will focus exclusive-
ly on assigned finite tasks, and will not question the scope or 
manner of the execution of such tasks. As exhausted as most 
firm attorneys will get, they will not admit to superiors that 
they need to work fewer hours and will often brag about how 
many late nights they spent at the office the previous week.84 If 
a superior asks an inferior what he or she is doing over the 
weekend, the inferior is expected to volunteer availability.85 The 
general expectation is that there is a seven-day workweek.86 
The workplace culture at firms also isolates firm lawyers, 
impeding camaraderie. Lawyers in other sectors are generally 
viewed as weak, disorganized, less accomplished, and less 
committed to their clients. A way of showing strength in firm 
culture is to work inhuman hours and still win. To exacerbate 
the issue, non-firm lawyers tend to show disdain for those 
working in the private sector, whom they may view as over-
paid, soulless, spoiled egomaniacs who have a bottomless well 
of support to draw upon.87  
In the end, these workplace norms lead to teams of unbal-
anced lawyers who (1) hate or resent clients or each other; (2) 
are overworked and tired yet are unwilling to recognize how 
this limits their abilities; (3) have no loyalty to their firm or its 
clients; and (4) have no sense of pride in being part of a legal 
profession. This creates an institutional environment rife with 
motivation and opportunities for poor lawyering.  
 
 83. Pearce, supra note 25, at 1268–70 (arguing that under a business par-
adigm model of practice, nonlawyers should also be allowed to provide legal 
services). 
 84. ABOVE THE LAW, supra note 80. 
 85. See Will Meyerhofer, Frying Pan, THE PEOPLE’S THERAPIST (Jan. 18, 
2012), http://thepeoplestherapist.com/2012/01/18/frying-pan/. 
 86. See, e.g., ABOVE THE LAW, supra note 80.  
 87. See, e.g., Sara Rimer, Revealing the Soul of a Soulless Lawyer, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2004, at 9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/ 
26/fashion/26BLOG.html#. 
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II.  APPLYING NEW INSTITUTIONALISM: THE SPECIFIC 
ETHICAL RULES IMPLICATED BY LAW FIRM PRACTICE   
Having outlined the basic structural framework of the 
modern law firm, this Part presents an overview of the major 
legal ethical issues implicated by current law firm practice.88 
Specifically, it examines a lawyer’s duty to his or her client to 
inform the client, and to act with loyalty, confidentiality, com-
petence, diligence, promptness, and financial integrity respect-
ing the client’s affairs. This Part closes with a brief discussion 
of professionalism and the duty to the profession. 
A. DUTY TO THE CLIENT 
At the core of professional responsibility is the duty and 
privilege of a lawyer to be an advisor to one’s client.89 In order 
to effectively tackle this role, the rules of professional responsi-
bility enumerate more specific sub-duties that build the requi-
site trust a lawyer needs to be an effective advisor.90  
1. Competence 
As an initial matter, a client expects her lawyer, at mini-
mum, to be competent.91 As the Model Rules require, “A lawyer 
shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thorough-
ness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representa-
tion.”92 The legal competence of a junior lawyer is predicated on 
good supervision and mentoring.93 The current system cannot 
sustain a consistent level of competency, since supervising at-
torneys are unable to provide the oversight needed to either 
 
 88. This Article will focus on the Model Rules, their accompanying com-
ments, and the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code) 
in discussing general rules of professional responsibility. The Model Rules 
have been adopted in full or in part by almost every state and represent the 
majority rule. Alphabetical List of States Adopting Model Rules, A.B.A. CTR. OF 
PROF’L RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/ 
publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_ 
adopting_model_rules.html ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012). 
 89. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 2 (2010). 
 90. See, e.g., id. R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.6 (detailing a lawyer’s responsibility to be 
competent, diligent, and to keep confidences). 
 91. See id. R. 1.1. 
 92. Id.  
 93. See, e.g., Professional Development, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & 
FELD L.L.P., http://www.akingump.com/careers/attorneys/development/ ( last 
visited Apr. 16, 2012). 
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cultivate competence or take comprehensive corrective 
measures.  
For a number of reasons, the billable hour system does not 
reward training. First, partners and associates are valued pri-
marily by the income or prestige they generate.94 Second, men-
toring and teaching is not billable. Third, partners and associ-
ates are already short on time for their billable work and 
themselves. Thus, mentoring falls to the wayside. Formal law-
yer-skills training, often used to satisfy continuing legal educa-
tion requirements, can include valuable stand up advocacy or 
writing workshops.95 However without meaningful mentorship 
and application to actual work, such programs function more as 
homage to what lawyering once was, as opposed to preparing 
attorneys for what lawyering currently is. Under these circum-
stances, time spent training associates on traditional lawyering 
skills often seems unnecessary at best, and a cruel tease at 
worst. 
Firm hierarchy also undermines competence. Cases are 
staffed in a pyramid structure.96 This leaves junior associates 
supervising large teams of contract attorneys, often in matters 
that they have never handled before.97 While junior associates 
educate themselves, they are given too many subordinates to 
effectively oversee detailed work. Because the basic workforce 
is made up of junior associates (who are increasingly transito-
ry) and contract attorneys (who may not be at the firm the next 
time such a project arrives) training is minimal and often con-
fined to a brief opening memo and answering questions on an 
ad hoc basis.98 There is little or no methodology to structuring 
cases or large document reviews.99 Although thoroughness on 
 
 94. See Schiltz, supra note 73, at 915. 
 95. See AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD L.L.P., supra note 93. 
 96. See Law Firm Partners Handling Larger Share of Work in Deleverag-
ing Trend, ALM.COM (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.alm.com/pressroom/2011/12/13/ 
law-firm-partners-handling-larger-share-of-work-in-deleveraging-trend-according 
-to-alm-legal-intelligence-survey-of-law-firm-staffing-models/. 
 97. Cf. Robert Hilson, Contract Attorneys Question Standards Top Law 
Firms Follow in Document Review Training and Supervision, DOCUMENT RE-
VIEW ENTER., INC. (July 20, 2011), http://www.documentreviewenterprise 
.com/site/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9:contract-attorneys 
-question-standards-top-law-firms-follow-in-document-review-training-and 
-supervision&catid=8:articles&Itemid=95 (noting an associate is often supervi-
sor of review). 
 98. See, e.g., Profile of Legal Career Changes, ATTORNEYJOBS.COM (2011), 
http://attorneyjobs.com/cm/careerdev/jdpreferred/profileoflegalcareerchanges. 
 99. But see id. (describing a three-tier document review system). 
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the part of the supervisor can compensate for some of this lack 
of expertise, it must be thoroughness combined with accuracy.  
2. Diligence  
A lawyer also owes his or her client a duty of diligence; he 
or she must be thorough and steadfast in the pursuit of his or 
her client’s needs.100 This duty is alluded to in Model Rule 1.1 
as “thoroughness,”101 and more specifically addressed in Model 
Rule 1.3 as diligence: “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable dili-
gence and promptness in representing a client.”102 Diligence is 
undermined when poor working conditions thwart best efforts 
to be detail-oriented. For example, physical conditions that are 
cramped and poorly lit, excessive travel, poor conceptual un-
derstanding of a case, and working too many hours in any given 
day or week lead to generally low morale and poor perfor-
mance. The human mind is simply unable to concentrate and 
function effectively when overstressed or without sleep.103 The 
physical work conditions impact stress levels.104 Particularly 
during intensive fact discovery, attorneys may be placed in 
dimly lit rooms with no natural light, reviewing paper and elec-
tronic documents elbow-to-elbow with other attorneys.105 Trav-
elling around the clock through many time zones disrupts sleep 
patterns and can lead to insomnia, gastrointestinal problems, 
and depression.106 
Medical studies have shown that functioning without suffi-
cient sleep impairs judgment, memory, and other cognitive 
functions, and can severely impact work functions.107 Even “a 
 
 100. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2010). 
 101. Id. R. 1.1 (“Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, 
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representa-
tion.”). 
 102. Id. R. 1.3. 
 103. See, e.g., Steven W. Lockley et al., Effect of Reducing Interns’ Weekly 
Work Hours on Sleep and Attentional Failures, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1829, 
1835 (2004). 
 104. Jacqueline C. Vischer, The Effects of the Physical Environment on Job 
Performance: Towards a Theoretical Model of Workspace Stress, 23 STRESS & 
HEALTH 175, 175 (2007). 
 105. Solnik, supra note 7. 
 106. Jet Lag and Shift Work, DIV. OF SLEEP MED., HARV. MED. SCH. (Dec. 
18, 2007), http://healthysleep.med.harvard.edu/healthy/science/variations/jet 
-lag-and-shift-work.  
 107. See, e.g., Lockley et al., supra note 103, at 1834–35; Brain Activity is 
Visibly Altered Following Sleep Deprivation, UNIV. OF CAL., SAN DIEGO (Feb. 
9, 2000), http://health.ucsd.edu/news/2000/2000_02_09_sleep.html. 
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reduction in sleep of only 1.5 hours per night for one night 
alone can result in a decrease in daytime alertness by 32%.”108 
In particular, “executive functions” such as assessing risk and 
consequences, adapting to changing environments, engaging in 
complex and creative decision making, multitasking, and 
providing innovative solutions are all impaired by relatively 
minor sleep loss.109 These are core functions of an attorney, yet 
they are physically compromised in the current institutional 
structure. These skills are further undermined by the fact that 
attorneys in the firm context may only have the most basic un-
derstanding of the case as they approach their work.110 All of 
these factors in combination place the duty of diligence on ten-
tative footing; when an attorney is overtired, unhappy, and un-
der-trained, the attorney makes mistakes—both technical and 
in judgment—and the duty to be diligent is undermined. 
3. Exercising Independent Judgment As an Advisor 
Although one of the more amorphous standards, a lawyer’s 
ability to exercise independent judgment is one of the most im-
portant duties a lawyer owes a client, the court, and the profes-
sion.111 It is this judgment that makes a lawyer a professional 
with expertise to offer a client.112 Without exercising judgment 
and advising, a lawyer is merely an access point for legal in-
formation that could readily be gleaned from a book, the Inter-
net, or a practice guide.113 Reflecting this importance, Model 
Rule 2.1 states that, “In representing a client, a lawyer shall 
exercise independent professional judgment and render candid 
advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law 
but to other considerations, such as moral, economic, social and 
political factors that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”114 
Success as an advisor is contingent on the marriage of skills with 
meticulous factual and legal analysis. Thus, the institutional fac-
tors that undermine competency and diligence also fundamental-
ly undercut an attorney’s ability to act as an independent judge 
 
 108. Vicki Culpin & Angela Whelan, The Wake-up Call for Sleepy Manag-
ers, ASHRIDGE J., 2009, at 1–2. 
 109. Id. at 2. 
 110. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 111. See MODEL CODE OF PROF ’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1980) (“A law-
yer should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client.”). 
 112. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2010). 
 113. See, e.g., id. R. 2.1 cmt. 2. 
 114. Id. R. 2.1. 
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and advisor. The aforementioned cognitive impairments from 
sleep deprivation are particularly problematic.115 
The ability to fulfill professional advising obligations is fur-
ther undermined by the internal culture of hierarchy at law 
firms. This culture does not usually provide an outlet for junior 
members to express views on issues requiring judgment, much 
less allow them to take action upon them. Non-partners often 
have very limited client contact.116 Although an associate may 
be solicited for her views on a finite issue in the form of an ad-
visory memo to the partner, their judgment is rarely independ-
ent.117 Usually, such memos are tailored to preexisting goals 
and issues raised by the partners, and partners make decisions 
as to what information is passed on to the client. The strong 
culture of conformity to hierarchy prevents an associate from 
raising any concerns directly with the client.  
4. Duty to Inform 
The duty to inform is central to the integrity of the lawyer-
client relationship.118 Without it, clients are unable to meaning-
fully participate in their own representation.119 Model Rule 
1.4(b), governing client communication, states that, “A lawyer 
shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the rep-
resentation.”120 In the current work structure, a lack of under-
standing of the whole case and of input into case management 
means that few attorneys, if any, are in a position to truly in-
form themselves of the issues in a case—much less in a position 
to inform the client. The only person who theoretically may 
have all the knowledge and facts necessary to inform the client 
is the overseeing partner. However, while the partner may be 
well informed of the law, he or she is completely dependent on 
associates, staff, and contract attorneys to parse, relay, and 
discern relevant information.  
 
 115. Culpin & Whelan, supra note 108, at 2. 
 116. But see First Year Associates, CURTIS, MALLET-PREVOST, COLT & 
MOSLE L.L.P., http://www.curtis.com/sitecontent.cfm?pageid=26 ( last visited 
Apr. 16, 2012) (advertising early client contact for junior associates). 
 117. But see MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 5.2 (indicating subordi-
nate lawyers have responsibility to act in accordance with professional rules 
that emphasize independent judgment). 
 118. See, e.g., id. R. 1.4. 
 119. Id. R. 1.4 cmt. 1. 
 120. Id. R. 1.4(b). 
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The fact finders’ unawareness of the true dimensions of the 
case compromises their abilities to bring pertinent facts to 
light. As an initial matter, successful fact-finding is dependent 
on an accurate encapsulation of the issues in a matter at the 
outset of discovery. Though they may be provided with copies of 
the relevant pleadings, few if any junior attorneys analyze or 
make these legal determinations themselves.121 Rather, associ-
ates, staff, and contract attorneys rely on superiors such as 
partners and senior associates to tell them what facts are rele-
vant and what major legal arguments the firm plans to make.122 
However, initially anticipated concerns may not turn out to be 
the actual issues the case turns upon, particularly if certain is-
sues come to light during discovery. As such, the system is of-
ten only effective if considerable re-reviewing of documents 
happens later. Due to turnover, such review may be done by a 
whole new team of attorneys who do not know the case, facts or 
documents at all.  
Even if the attorneys do know which issues and facts to 
pull from the information available, the conditions of review 
make it virtually impossible to do so accurately: fact finders are 
not able to carefully and analytically review. This is particular-
ly likely in scenarios where junior lawyers are often multitask-
ing to make more hours billable, may lack interest in, or even 
resent, their clients, or where they are unfocused simply be-
cause they are tired and it is late. As such, it may be that no at-
torney on a given case has an accurate understanding of the 
facts and law needed to inform the client of their choices or po-
tential conflicts.123  
5. Duty of Loyalty 
a. Conflicts with Other Clients 
Of all the duties a lawyer owes to a client, the Model Rules 
focus most heavily on the duty of loyalty.124 One Comment to 
Model Rule 1.7 lists loyalty and independent judgment as es-
 
 121. See, e.g., Kate Neville, Why Associates Bail out of Law Firm Life—and 
Why It Matters, AMHERST COLLEGE (Nov. 14, 2007), https://www.amherst 
.edu/alumni/connect/networks/lawyersnetwork/careerplanning/www.amherst.e
du_lawyers_associatesbail (discussing the lack of decision-making authority 
attorneys have until they advance to partner). 
 122. See, e.g., id. 
 123. See supra Part II.A.1. This point also goes to the issue of competency.  
 124. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.7–1.18.  
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sential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a client.125 How-
ever, lawyers cannot be loyal to their clients—which is to say 
without conflict amongst and with their clients—when they are 
uninformed of the issues in a case or have conflicting personal 
interests.126 In the context of a modern law firm, lawyers and 
supervisors often do not have enough information to be aware 
of conflicts and make reasonable assessments.127 Also, when a 
lawyer’s very livelihood is in tension with a broad understand-
ing of what is a conflict, that lawyer is likely to interpret con-
flicts narrowly.  
Generally, the Model Rules do not excuse breaches of loyal-
ty for ignorance.128 The general principles governing the Model 
Rules’ articulation of the duty of loyalty place the burden of 
finding conflicts on the lawyer: “a lawyer should adopt reason-
able procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and 
practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation mat-
ters the persons and issues involved.”129  
The general law firm response to finding conflicts in a rap-
idly shifting workforce with fluid caseloads has been to create a 
“conflicts check” procedure to vet new matters. A lawyer sub-
mits a “conflicts check request” where he or she lists parties in-
volved in the matter, adverse or not. An administrative de-
partment, not necessarily staffed by lawyers, runs a search 
through the files of the firm for the listed parties. Once a new 
matter passes this conflicts’ check, a partner or senior associate 
usually signs off on the conflict check. This mechanical search, 
while a necessity, regularly catches only the most obvious and 
glaring conflicts. 
After this step, the partner or senior associate delegates 
responsibility for conflicts to the junior associates, contract at-
torneys, and staff attorneys who are instructed to raise con-
 
 125. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 1. 
 126. Id. R. 1.7(a)(2). 
 127. But see id. R. 1.7 cmt. 3 (indicating that law firms should have appro-
priate procedures to identify the persons and issues involved so as to deter-
mine whether conflicts of interest exist). 
 128. See id. (“Ignorance caused by a failure to institute such [reasonable] 
procedures will not excuse a lawyer’s violation of this Rule.”). Thus, an indi-
vidual lawyer may still be responsible for such oversight if the firm’s proce-
dures are found unreasonable. Id. 
 129. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 3. 
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flicts “as they arise” over the course of fact-finding.130 Here, the 
institutional nature of a large firm and its work structure is all 
important; this system makes it virtually impossible for any 
associate, staff attorney, or contract attorney to be aware of the 
other matters the firm is handling or even the scope of the rep-
resentation.131 They simply do not know who or what is  
important.132  
For the associate, the task of identifying and flagging such 
potential client conflicts is more plausible, but still quite lim-
ited. Associates also rarely have the entire relevant picture.133 
Some may have been employed with the firm for a short time. 
Others may have only worked on a limited number of matters 
in a very specific capacity. Of course, if they have been with the 
firm longer and are privy to more high-end discussions, associ-
ates may have actual knowledge of potential conflicts. Moreo-
ver, because of their place in the firm hierarchy, associates may 
feel more comfortable pointing out an ethical issue to a superi-
or.134 Nevertheless, on an individual level, these lawyers are of-
ten ignorant of unanticipated conflicts that arise in the course 
of litigation.135  
The task of identifying conflicts on an ongoing basis is even 
more difficult, perhaps impossible, for the staff and contract at-
torneys who do the bulk of early fact gathering.136 Firms delib-
erately give these attorneys limited access to knowledge of oth-
er firm matters to avoid additional potential conflicts and 
 
 130. For a discussion of the ethical implications of conflict checking, see 
generally Paul R. Tremblay, Migrating Lawyers and the Ethics of Conflict 
Checking, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489 (2006). 
 131. Cf. James M. Fischer, Large Law Firm Lateral Hire Conflicts Check-
ing: Professional Duty Meets Actual Practice, 36 J. LEGAL PROFESSION 167, 
174–78 (2011) (discussing the presumption that “what the lawyer knows, the 
entire firm knows”). 
 132. See, e.g., id.  
 133. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 134. See Carolyn Elefant, The Secret Life of Contract Lawyers, LAW.COM, 
(Nov. 8, 2007, 4:31 PM), http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/legal_blog_watch/ 
2007/11/the-secret-life.html (exemplifying the hierarchical relationship be-
tween staff attorneys and contract attorneys by referencing an incident in 
which staff attorneys rebuked contract attorneys for typing too loudly). 
 135. See Robert C. Rodriguez, Ethics Opinion 352 Stresses Risks Associated 
with Temporary Attorneys, A.B.A. (Apr. 29, 2010), http://apps.americanbar.org/ 
litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/042810-ethics-confidentiality-contract-
attorneys.html (noting the ethical risks associated with temporary attorneys). 
 136. See id. (noting that some firms use “safeguards to ensure the contract 
attorney does not have access to the firm’s client confidential information ex-
cept for the specific matter on which the contract attorney is working”). 
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breaches of confidentiality when these parties move onto their 
next job at another firm.137 To exacerbate the problem, contract 
attorneys may not always be supervised directly by associates, 
but, rather, by managers hired by the firms to keep costs 
down.138 Finally, for some non-associate attorneys the potential 
cost of raising a conflict (annoying or embarrassing a superior, 
appearing ignorant before a superior, leading to less work and 
eventually being let go) could outweigh the benefit of raising a 
conflict (protecting the firm from potential ethical issues, satis-
faction in upholding professional responsibility standards), 
something that works against the client’s interests.  
The Model Rules attempt to deal specifically with conflicts 
at firms in Rule 1.10, outlining imputations of conflicts of inter-
ests.139 To a greater or lesser degree, each aspect of this rule has 
to do with materiality—how important is the conflict, how 
much does it impede representation, and how to limit conflicts 
so that the firm may continue representation of a client even if 
a conflict exist.140 Unfortunately, all of these rules are only ef-
fective with a clear and unbiased reporting of the lawyer’s pre-
vious engagements.141 As such, they are ineffective at address-
ing the core issues raised by the current work structure. Law 
firms are unable to know, factually, whether or not conflicts ex-
ist, because they are unfamiliar with the background of their 
attorneys and the facts implicated in their cases.142 In addition, 
attorneys have a strong interest in interpreting materiality and 
client conflicts in an overly limited fashion to maximize the 
number or representations the firm can take on and to ensure 
that they themselves will be allowed to be staffed on a given 
matter.  
b. Conflicts with Lawyers’ Interests  
Under the current firm structure, perhaps the largest con-
flicts arise between a lawyer’s conscious and subconscious per-
sonal interests and the interests of the client. The Model Rules 
 
 137. Id.  
 138. See Hayes, supra note 38, at 13. 
 139. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2010). 
 140. See id. 
 141. See Todd C. Scott, Conflict Checking Systems: Three Great (and 
Cheap) Ways to Effectively Manage Conflict Checking, LAW TRENDS & NEWS, 
(Feb. 2006), http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/law_trends_ 
news_practice_area_e_newsletter_home/conflictchecking.html (indicating that 
a conflict “system is only as good as the information that is put into it”). 
 142. But see MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 3. 
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recognize that, “[c]oncurrent conflicts of interest can 
arise . . . from the lawyer’s own interests.”143 In the current sys-
tem, every attorney in the law firm, from partner to contract 
attorney, is worried on some level about losing his or her job 
and remaining valuable to the firm. This makes for a powerful 
interest. For firm lawyers, a job is contingent on many things—
not being conflicted out of a matter is the threshold issue to 
overcome, with billing enough hours being the long-term issue. 
A lawyer might, for instance, ignore or minimize a potential 
conflict of interest in order to avoid being conflicted out of a po-
tentially lucrative case. Thus, livelihood is often in tension with 
loyalty to the client.  
Contract attorneys, more than perhaps anyone else in this 
group, are constantly under pressure to find a way to work and 
stay employed. Because contract attorneys are constantly mov-
ing between firms and through cases, firms rely on contract at-
torneys to accurately list and assess “reasonably” the matters 
they have worked on.144 The inherently transient nature of con-
tract attorney work, where attorneys are involved only superfi-
cially in matters, could lead contract attorneys to “reasonably” 
assess in their favor that no true conflict exists between them 
and a party on a matter they would like to work on.145 However, 
their own financial interests are in tension with broader disclo-
sure. Because there is no centralized record of attorney activity, 
firms and agencies are entirely dependent on individual attor-
neys to be forthcoming.  
 
 143. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 1.  
 144. See Fischer, supra note 131, at 211. 
 145. Model Rule 1.7(b) states that: 
Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest un-
der paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: (1) the lawyer 
reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent 
and diligent representation to each affected client; . . . and (4) each af-
fected client gives informed consent confirmed in writing. 
Id. R. 1.7(b). Some might argue that clients are fully aware of the conditions 
under which lawyers at law firms work and the limitations entailed in that 
work since they receive detailed billing statements and sign a retainer includ-
ing the billing policy as part of their engagement papers. I would argue in op-
position to this that even if such writing constitutes consent that consent is 
uninformed or based on misinformation. Clients do not understand how con-
tract attorneys are screened in terms of potential conflicts, qualification, or 
how the firm approaches the partnership track. 
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6. Confidentiality 
The institutional norms of private-sector practice have a 
greater troubling impact on maintaining client confidentiality. 
Model Rule 1.6 governs confidentiality between a client and his 
or her attorney.146 It provides that “[a] lawyer shall not reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client.”147 How-
ever, pressure to bill and respond instantly to clients as well as 
regular institutional turnover undermines this obligation. 
Billing and norms of hyper-responsiveness undermine con-
fidentiality because they encourage, and even compel, lawyers 
to work and render advice in public places.148 In an attempt to 
maximize hours, lawyers may read, review, and respond to var-
ious client matters during their commutes or travel time.149 
Blackberries and cell phones allow lawyers to respond to client 
matters outside of a confidential office setting, while norms in 
the practice provide the expectation that a lawyer will respond 
to their clients’ questions or calls instantaneously.150 Therefore, 
lawyers are expected to discuss client matters while at the 
lunch counter, walking down the street, in buses or train sta-
tions and any number of other public places where there can be 
no reasonable expectation of privacy.  
The current structure of firms, through partnership norms 
and the increased use of temporary labor, also undermines cli-
ent confidentiality by creating an increasingly transient legal 
workforce. Every time a lawyer leaves a firm to go to another 
job, there is, inherently, an increased risk to client confidential-
ity.151 People have knowledge, conscious and unconscious, re-
garding the affairs of the client, adverse parties, and often, giv-
en the nature of electronic discovery, the personal lives of 
people working for or with the client. Despite confidentiality 
concerns, firms remain structurally predisposed to encourage 
matriculation and a norm of lawyer fungibility.  
 
 146. Id. R. 1.6. 
 147. Id. R. 1.6(a).  
 148. See Law Firms Discovering ‘New Found Time’ with TimeKM Mobile 
for BlackBerry, BLACKBERRY.COM, http://www.blackberry.com/newsletters/ 
connection/business_solutions/i3-2007/defense-lawyer-qa.shtml?CPID=NLC-41 
( last visited Apr. 16, 2012). 
 149. See Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Hot Buttons, 32 L. PRAC. 26, 
26 (2006). 
 150. See id. 
 151. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (discussing a lawyer’s 
obligation to a client associated with the lawyer’s former firm). 
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First, as a general rule, law firms currently take on far 
more first-year associates than they could ever sustain as part-
ners.152 Historically, firms relied on associate matriculation to 
thin the ranks of the upcoming classes. In good economic times, 
this would happen organically; associates find other gainful 
employment that fits their needs—often the need is to have 
better hours, more interesting work, and other quality-of-life 
benefits.153 In lean times, this matriculation happens by force, 
through lawyers being unofficially “encouraged to look else-
where,” mass layoffs, and outright firings through exaggerated 
negative performance reviews.154 Associates, who have no right 
to a severance package or notice, and rarely even have a con-
tract with the firm, have little or no bargaining leverage to op-
pose the terms of their dismissal. Even if matriculation hap-
pens organically, remaining associates do not necessarily stand 
a strong chance of making partner; firms increasingly draw 
partners from lateral sources—from other sectors or other 
firms, rather than elevating associates internally.155 Finally, 
some have noted that lawyers uncomfortable with these ethical 
tensions may feel compelled to leave the firm rather than at-
tempt to change it.156 
Second, firms’ increased dependence on temporary legal 
staff means lawyers are regularly cycling in and out of the law 
firm. Each cycle undermines confidentiality. These attorneys 
 
 152. Janet Ellen Raasch, Making Partner or Not: Is It in, up or over in the 
21st Century?, 33 LAW PRAC. 32, 35 (2007) (“In a firm with three associates for 
each partner—which is considered the ‘sweet spot’—two of every three associ-
ates (regardless of their talent) will not make partner. Many highly profitable 
firms have four or five associates per partner; some consultants are predicting 
eventual levels of 10 to 1.”). 
 153. Martha Neil, Why Associates Leave Is Clear, but What Would Lure 
Them to Stay?, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 21, 2008), http://www.abajournal.com/news/ 
article/why_associates_leave_is_clear_but_what_would_lure_them_to_stay/. 
 154. See Sara Randazzo, For This Year’s New Partners, Perseverance Pays, 
AMERICANLAWYER.COM (Jan. 17, 2012), www.law.com (search “New Partners 
Perseverance” in Quest box, then follow hyperlink for article title). In this con-
text, lawyers have no rights; they are at-will employees entitled to two weeks’ 
notice. Severance packages at big law firms have been generous at times but 
paltry at others. See Latham Offers Huge Severance Package, JD J. (Mar. 2, 
2009), http://www.jdjournal.com/2009/03/02/latham-offers-huge-severance-package/.  
 155. Cf. Randazzo, supra note 154 (indicating that anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that many of the class of 2011 partners did not take the traditional path 
to partnership by practicing at the same firm they joined from law school). 
 156. See, e.g., Fortney, supra note 4, at 178 (arguing based on survey data 
collected from law firm associates and partners, that the billing pressures in 
law firms encourages “the exodus of ethical associates who leave private law 
practice rather than rationalizing questionable billing practices”). 
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are engaged for short periods of time on a case-by-case basis.157 
Such lawyers may be contract attorneys that are brought into 
the firm, with general access to firm facilities and other files, or 
off-site attorneys hired through domestic or international out-
sourcing.158 The nature of discovery is very fact intensive. These 
lawyers, who are usually hired to do discovery, have access to 
voluminous facts. As such, every time temporary attorneys 
move on to new firms, they carry with them a wealth of infor-
mation specific to certain companies and people that could slip 
out in subsequent jobs and become unprivileged. When the ro-
tation of attorneys in and out of various firms is so frequent 
that it cannot be monitored and disciplined effectively by the 
bar, turnover becomes a confidentiality problem for the profes-
sion as a whole. 
One might argue that the use of internal screens within 
law firms can combat some of these confidentiality issues.159 
 
 157. See, e.g., Temporary Attorney: Employers, JURISTAFF.COM, http://www 
.juristaff.com/temporary-services-attorney-employers/ ( last visited Apr. 16, 
2012). 
 158. The ethical implications of exporting legal work abroad is an issue de-
serving of the considerable attention it has received elsewhere. See ABA 
Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 451 (2008) (reviewing a 
lawyer’s obligations when outsourcing legal and nonlegal services); Joshua A. 
Bachrach, Offshore Legal Outsourcing and Risk Management: Proposing Pro-
spective Limitation of Liability Agreements Under Model Rule 1.8(h), 21 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 631, 631–33 (2008); Mary C. Daly & Carole Silver, Flattening 
the World of Legal Services? The Ethical and Liability Minefields of Offshoring 
Legal and Law Related Services, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 401, 401 (2007); James I. 
Ham, Ethical Considerations Relating to Outsourcing of Legal Services by Law 
Firms to Foreign Service Providers: Perspectives from the United States, 27 
PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 323, 323 (2008); Alison M. Kadzik, The Current Trend 
to Outsource Legal Work Abroad and the Ethical Issues Related to Such Prac-
tices, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 731, 731 (2006); Michael G. Owen, Legal Out-
sourcing to India: The Demise of New Lawyers and Junior Associates, 21 PAC. 
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 175, 180 (2008); Mark L. Tuft, Supervis-
ing Offshore Outsourcing of Legal Services in a Global Environment: Re-
examining Current Ethical Standards, 43 AKRON L. REV. 825, 826 (2010); 
Keith Woffinden, Surfing the Next Wave of Outsourcing: The Ethics of Sending 
Domestic Legal Work to Foreign Countries Under New York City Opinion 
2006–3, 2007 BYU L. REV. 483, 495–502. This Article will not address these 
ethical implications of international practice issues in detail at this time. 
However, since such practices are profit driven, if attorney unionization were 
to take place and require minimum pay for such attorneys commensurate with 
domestic pay, the instances of offshore contract lawyering would most likely 
decrease. 
 159. Screening is defined as “the isolation of a lawyer from any participa-
tion in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm 
that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information 
that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these Rules or other law.” 
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Model Rule 1.9 allows a lawyer to be screened with the consent 
of the relevant client(s),160 while recent revisions to Model Rule 
1.10 allow attorneys, in some cases, to be screened with notice, 
rather than formal former client consent.161 However, screening 
precautions are only effective insofar as they are based on ac-
curate knowledge of the attorneys’ prior representations and an 
accurate sense of the adversarial scope of the current client’s 
case.162 Therefore, screening itself is subject to the same prag-
matic limitations as any confidentiality or conflicts rules in so 
far as it relies entirely on self reporting and transparency. 
7. Financial Integrity 
Model Rule 1.5 governs financial integrity.163 It requires 
that “[a] lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or 
collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for ex-
penses.”164 A lawyer’s duty to act with financial integrity toward 
his or her client is often viewed as an issue of honesty and can-
dor.165 In the law firm setting, however, it is married with, and 
mired in, far more quotidian concerns of billing structures.166 
Fees in the modern law firm are predominately dictated by 
time spent on a given matter.167 However, Model Rule 1.5 lists 
 
MODEL RULES OR PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(k) (2010). Courts also refer to a 
“screen” as a “cone of silence,” a “Chinese Wall,” a “firewall,” or a “wall.” Susan 
R. Martyn, Screens: The Brave New World?, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar 
.org/publications/young_lawyer_home/young_lawyer_archive/screens_the_brave_ 
new_world.html ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012). 
 160. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a) (“A lawyer who has for-
merly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another 
person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s 
interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the 
former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.”).  
 161. Id. R. 1.10(a)(2)(ii). Thirteen jurisdictions allow screening of a lateral 
lawyer without former client consent. Martyn, supra note 159.  
 162. See Andrew J. Drucker, Note, Explanations, Suggestions, and Solu-
tions to Conflict Tracking and Prevention in Response to the Growth and Ex-
pansion of the Larger Law Firm, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 529, 549–50 (1999). 
 163. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.5. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See George L. Blum, Annotation, Attorney’s Charging Excessive Fee as 
Ground for Disciplinary Action—Business and Tax, Employee Benefits and 
Termination, Civil Rights, and Other Limited Civil Matters, 27 A.L.R.6th 1, 1 
(2007). 
 166. See Josh Dickinson, Great Expectations (Part 2): The Billable Hour, 
Bane of Your Existence, ABOVE THE LAW (Sept. 20, 2010, 12:11 PM), http:// 
abovethelaw.com/2010/09/great-expectations-part-2-the-bane-of-your-existence/. 
 167. A.B.A. COMM’N ON BILLABLE HOURS, supra note at 42, at 3. 
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eight factors to be considered in assessing the fee structure of a 
given representation:  
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the ques-
tions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly; 
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the 
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the  
client; 
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers 
performing the services; and 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.168 
Note that only factors (1) and (5) directly pertain to hours 
spent on a given matter.169 The Model Rules give equal weight 
to several other factors related to competency, experience, and 
outcome.170 By contrast, the modern law firm emphasizes, al-
most exclusively, the amount of time spent on a matter as the 
appropriate measure of a lawyer’s fair wage.171 In so doing, 
firms are overemphasizing time’s role in the billing structure, 
at the expense of numerous other meaningful factors. Rather 
than modifying their billing structures, however, firms persist 
in using the billable hour as an easy-to-administer (though in-
accurate) proxy for the actual value of attorney work.172 
Unfortunately, law firms are institutionally unable to com-
bat this imbalance. Their customs and conventions—such as 
prioritizing billing as the primary measure of value; normaliz-
ing routine overwork; sleep deprivation; and extreme workforce 
matriculation; and imposing rigid work-flow hierarchies—
prevent implementation of a more nuanced value structure for 
attorney work.173 Indeed, a fee structure that would balance all 
 
 168. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a). 
 169. Id. For a discussion on the practical application of this rule, see 
Turow, supra note 45, at 35 (“[D]espite the fact that our profession’s guiding 
ethical rule [regarding fees] encourages lawyers to look to other factors, dollars 
times hours remains the near universal standard of commercial litigation.”). 
 170. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a). 
 171. A.B.A. COMM’N ON BILLABLE HOURS, supra note at 42, at 3. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Ashby Jones, On Working Mothers at Big Firms: A Blistering Cri-
tique, WSJ L. BLOG (Feb. 16, 2010, 1:58 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/02/ 
16/on-working-mothers-at-big-firms-a-blistering-critique/ (noting the rigorous 
working conditions of a large law firm associate). 
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of the factors listed in Model Rule 1.5 would require a more de-
tailed and ongoing relationship between firms and employee 
lawyers, one in which law firms would know their attorneys’ 
respective skill levels and expertise as well as the quality of 
their attorneys’ work.  
The current private-sector model impedes a lawyer’s ability 
to be diligent and skillful. This, in turn, limits opportunities to 
expedite litigation,174 which leads to unreasonably high fees. In 
essence, the financial integrity of any lawyer working in the 
private sector is compromised by the conditions under which he 
or she works. Efficiency is compromised in several ways. First, 
attorneys are tired, so redundancies must be put in place to 
catch errors.175 It is unclear how a lawyer may fairly bill a client 
for an hour of that lawyers’ time when that lawyer’s work will 
be highly variable depending on whether it is the first hour in 
the day or sixteenth.176 Second, the firm’s institutional com-
mitment to specialized and meaningful lawyer training is 
weak.177 This undermines the legitimacy of the high hourly rate 
that firms charge clients for alleged expertise. Third, employees 
are strongly motivated to inflate hours.178 Because the reputa-
tion of a law firm is tied, at least in part, to profits per partner, 
pressure to bill is high for all attorneys. 
Beyond this subconscious gaming of the system, poor work-
ing conditions also necessitate increased working hours for a 
number of reasons. First, mistakes are costly. They require 
hours of review to catch and hours of duplicate work. Second, 
because people have too much on their plate to coordinate or 
are unable or unwilling to concentrate further, lapses in plan-
 
 174. See supra Part II.A.1–4. 
 175. See Eve Tahmincioglu, Health Aides, Lawyers Are Most Sleep De-
prived, MSN, http://lifeinc.today.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/02/27/10518575-
health-aides-lawyers-are-most-sleep-deprived ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012). 
 176. See, e.g., Michelle Conlin, Smashing the Clock, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 11, 2006), www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_ 
50/b4013001.htm (noting an increase in productivity when work hour re-
quirements are relaxed). 
 177. But cf. David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at A1 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
11/20/business/after-law-school-associates-learn-to-be-lawyers.html?pagewanted= 
1&sq&st=nyt&scp=1 (“[A]t Drinker Biddle, first-year associates spend four 
months getting a primer on corporate law. During this time, they work at a 
reduced salary and they are neither expected nor allowed to bill a client. It’s 
good marketing for the firm and a novel experience for the trainees.”). 
 178. See James P. Schratz, I Told You to Fire Nicholas Farber—A Psycho-
logical and Sociological Analysis of Why Attorneys Overbill, 50 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 2211, 2216 (1998). 
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ning occur that require scrambling at the last minute to get 
work done before a deadline.179 Finally, in an attempt to im-
press clients or partners, attorneys set unreasonable and arbi-
trary deadlines for the completion of work.180 These unneces-
sary fire drills run up costs to clients as they require round-the-
clock work and significant additional redundancies. 
Ultimately though, the billing structure itself creates a 
conflict when billable hours must be maximized for a lawyer to 
protect his livelihood. In other words, a lawyer may have a fi-
nancial interest in billing more time even though the client will 
not benefit from the extra lawyering. Contract attorneys, staff 
attorneys, associates, and partners alike all need to bill hours 
to build clout, job security, and increase their mobility within 
the industry.181 Thus, work becomes a race to the bottom, re-
warding those who work all hours of the night and file all pos-
sible paperwork, over those who manage cases more leanly. 
Law firms are institutionally embedded in a greater legal 
culture where they fear that if they push back on clients or 
provide service less hastily, the client will simply go to another 
firm willing to treat its lawyers worse.182 Moreover, the Model 
Rules themselves perpetuate this time-based culture by incor-
porating, and therefore validating, unreasonable norms.183 This 
environment undermines a lawyer’s ability to serve clients  
ethically.  
8. Professionalism and Duty to the Profession  
Finally, the current private-sector system of working and 
interacting with clients severely undermines the dignity of the 
profession as a whole. The preamble to the ABA Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility argues that “[t]he continued existence of a 
free and democratic society depends upon recognition of the 
concept that justice is based upon the rule of law grounded in 
respect for the dignity of the individual and his capacity 
through reason for enlightened self-government.”184 The legal 
 
 179. See Amiram Elwork, A Lawyer’s Guide to Dealing with Burnout, 24 
PA. LAW. 24, 25 (2002). 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. at 26. 
 182. See generally Law Firms, A Less Gilded Future, ECONOMIST, May 5, 
2011, at 74 (noting the impact of the economic downturn on law firms). 
 183. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a)(3) (2010) (using “the 
fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services” as a measure 
of the validity of a given fee structure). 
 184. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1980) (citation omitted). 
 2012] ATTORNEY UNIONS AND PROFESSIONALISM 1515 
 
profession is charged with upholding this dignity. However, it 
is difficult to see how the profession can protect human dignity 
for others when it fails to safeguard the dignity of its own  
colleagues. 
The public view of lawyers has been in a steady and 
marked decline over the last thirty years.185 Indeed, much of the 
public views lawyers as greedy, uncaring, manipulative, and 
corrupt.186 It is understandable that the public has lost respect 
for law as a profession when lawyers allow themselves and 
their fellow lawyers to be treated without dignity, and as ex-
pendable parts in the law firm machinery. Because of the 
strong influence firms and firm lawyers have over the bar, and 
their prominence in the public eye, the institutional failures of 
law firms are magnified. Hierarchies of attorneys within firms, 
inequitable distributions of firm wealth, unclear expectations, 
variable and unclear benefits, a lack of agency or knowledge, 
job insecurity, and general overwork all render a firm attorney 
subhuman. If we are to hope or expect the profession to be re-
habilitated in the public eye, then it must begin with the digni-
fied and just treatment of lawyers.  
 
 185. See generally LEO J. SHAPIRO & ASSOCS., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF 
LAWYERS: CONSUMER RESEARCH FINDINGS 8, 18 (2002), available at 
http://www.cliffordlaw.com/abaillinoisstatedelegate/publicperceptions1.pdf 
(“Consumers tell stories of lawyers who misrepresent their qualifications, 
overpromise, are not upfront about their fees, charge too much for their ser-
vices, take too long to resolve matters, and fail to return client phone calls.”); 
Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opin-
ion, Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 808–10 (1998) (dis-
cussing statistical data regarding public attitudes about lawyers and the lack 
of public trust in lawyers); Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi the Public Percep-
tion of Lawyers: ABA Poll, 79 A.B.A. J. 60, 60–62 (1993) (reporting, among 
other things, that only twenty-two percent of the public believed lawyers are 
honest and ethical); Chris Klein, Poll: Lawyers Not Liked, NAT’L. L.J., Aug. 25, 
1997, at A6 (noting that the public’s view of the profession of law as one of 
“very great prestige” dropped by nearly half from 1977 to 1997).  
 186. In a 2004 Gallup Poll asking the public to rate twenty-one professions 
based on honesty and ethical standards, lawyers ranked 19th, ahead of only 
“advertising practitioners” and “car salesmen.” David W. Moore, Nurses Top 
List in Honesty and Ethics Poll, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE (Dec. 7, 2004), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/14236/nurses-top-list-honesty-ethics-poll.aspx?version= 
print; see also LEO J. SHAPIRO & ASSOCS., supra note 185, at 4, 8 (noting that 
consumers generally describe lawyers as “greedy, manipulative and corrupt” 
with sixty-nine percent of respondents agreeing with the statement that “law-
yers are more interested in making money than in serving their clients”); 
Symposium, Improving the Professionalism of Lawyers: Can Commissions, 
Committees, and Centers Make a Difference?, 52 S.C. L. REV. 443, 490 (2001) 
(noting that the public thinks lawyers are “greedy . . . dishonest, deceitful, ma-
nipulative, and uncaring” and citing a 1993 survey by Peter Hart for the ABA).  
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III.  POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS   
Surprisingly, little of the academic literature focuses on po-
tential solutions to ethical problems caused by the labor norms 
of attorneys in the private legal sector. This Part will explore 
several of the possibilities for how to deal with these issues.  
A. BANISH THE BILLABLE HOUR 
While many have argued that the billable hour system 
ought to be abolished,187 there is little likelihood that this 
movement will prevail. The billable hour is pervasive across 
both the private and public sector.188 While strong arguments 
have been made in favor of replacing the billable hour with a 
“fixed fee structure,”189 a broad movement towards fixed fees 
has not materialized. Proponents of this change argue that cli-
ents are ultimately interested in value and outcomes over the 
amount of time it takes to reach those outcomes and that law 
firms would benefit from the administrative costs saved.190 
While there is some evidence that these views are gaining more 
traction in the context of client demands for alternative billing 
structures,191 there is still no wide-scale shift away from the 
billable hour on the horizon. 
 
 187. See, e.g., Lisa G. Lerman, The Slippery Slope from Ambition to Greed 
to Dishonesty: Lawyers, Money and Professional Integrity, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
879, 916 (2002) (arguing the practice of imposing billable-hour requirements 
should be abandoned); Turow, supra note 45, at 35. 
 188. While public-sector attorneys do not often have billable hour require-
ments, many do bill their time to the municipality or state by the hour and are 
compensated based on their timekeeping. See, e.g., CJA Panel Attorney Infor-
mation, U.S. DIST. COURT, N.Y.W. DIST., http://www.nywd.uscourts.gov/ 
document/CJAPANEL.pdf ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (noting hourly compen-
sation structure for attorneys appearing through the federal Criminal Justice 
Act); Contra Costa County Court’s Appellate Panel, CONTRA COSTA CNTY. B. 
ASS’N, http://www.cccba.org/attorney/build-your-practice/paying-appellate-panel 
.php ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (noting that attorneys who appear represent-
ing indigent clients on behalf of the state are compensated at a rate of $65 per 
hour for out-of-court work, and $120 for court appearances); Fee Schedule For 
Criminal Cases, ALAMEDA CNTY. B. ASS’N (July 1, 2010), https://www.acbanet 
.org/UserFiles/files/PDFs/LinksLibrary/CAAPFeeSchedulePostedSept2010.pdf 
(noting hourly rates and reporting requirements for attorneys representing 
indigent clients through the Criminal Court Appointed Attorneys Program).  
 189. J. Benjamin Stevens, Make Time Work for You: Handling Cases on a 
Fixed-Fee Basis, LAW PRACTICE TODAY, A.B.A. (July 2010), http://apps 
.americanbar.org/lpm/lpt/articles/ftr07103.shtml. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Glater, supra note 51. 
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Moreover, it is not clear that a move away from the billable 
hour, without corresponding cultural and labor changes in law 
firm practice, would address the ethical issues endemic in cur-
rent institutions. On the contrary, some have argued that flat 
fees lead to minimal representation and encourage laziness.192 
In addition, the rules of ethics regarding fees clearly state that 
consideration of time as a factor in fees is warranted.193 As 
such, the key to a functional billing system is to treat time 
spent on a matter as one balanced element in the equation of 
ethical lawyer fees, rather than as the dispositive force.  
B. RELY ON FIRMS TO POLICE ETHICS 
The current system relies on internal safeguards in the 
firm and lawyer discipline through the bar to enforce ethical 
norms. For reasons detailed in Part II, a firm’s internal 
measures are usually not effective in policing the systemic is-
sues that undermine the firm’s ability to create an ethical work 
environment as a whole.194 Specifically, lawyers are strongly 
motivated to downplay ethical issues and conflicts in order to 
maintain their status and job stability.195 Furthermore, lawyers 
often do not have the information or agency necessary to make 
strong advisory decisions for clients and lack perspective on the 
reasonable limits of their capabilities.196 In short, because of a 
culture of questionable professional norms, law firms are not 
objective or effective arbiters of their own actions.  
C. DISCIPLINING LAWYERS THROUGH THE BAR  
Hypothetically, the bar could regulate and enforce ethics 
violations regarding individuals at law firms. However, this is 
impracticable for several reasons. First, the rules of ethics are 
 
 192. Mark Bennett, Flat Fee Fight: What’s Really Going On?, DEFENDING 
PEOPLE (Feb. 15, 2012, 11:45 AM), http://blog.bennettandbennett.com/2011/01/ 
flat-fee-fight-whats-really-going-on.html (reporting on Texas state bar finding 
that flat fees for public defense work were ethically dubious); Meredith Hobbs, 
Some Lawyers Say Flat Fees Pose Ethics Issues, LAW.COM (Jan. 10, 2011), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/article.jsp?id=1202477784052&Some_Lawyers_Sa
y_Flat_Fees_Pose_Ethics_Issues (stating that this would lead to ethics  
concerns). 
 193. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2010) ( listing eight factors 
to consider in fees).  
 194. See supra Part II. 
 195. See Elwork, supra note 179.  
 196. See id. at 25–26 (“[Lawyers] tend to be . . . obsessed with control but 
unconvinced that they have it.”). 
 1518 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:1482 
 
ineffective at curtailing many institutional issues in law firms 
because they provide neither a break with harmful institution-
al cultures,197 nor sufficiently clear standards.198 Indeed, one 
might argue that these rules can facilitate harmful institution-
al norms. For example, the factors to be considered in deter-
mining the reasonableness of a fee do not include the working 
conditions of the lawyers or whether it is possible to do the 
work more efficiently.199 Rather, the factors look principally at 
norms in a given locale for similar legal services.200 Such a focus 
is ineffective in curtailing costs associated with institutional 
flaws in labor (or other structures) since other firms almost all 
embrace the same set of flawed institutional components.201 
Furthermore, in their application to law firms, the Model 
Rules are also peppered with amorphous terms that de facto 
assimilate and normalize prevailing firm culture. Such terms 
are ultimately both ambiguous and overly pliable. The term 
“reasonable” is pervasive.202 While the Model Rules clearly state 
that associates, staff attorneys and contract attorneys are sub-
ject to ethical discipline for their actions,203 they are excused 
from accountability if they act “in accordance with a superviso-
ry lawyer’s reasonable resolution of an arguable question of 
professional duty.”204 Similarly, partners and supervisors are 
excused from accountability for ethical violations so long as 
they made “reasonable efforts” either “to ensure that the firm 
has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all 
lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Con-
duct.”205 Discipline for failing to supervise is only allowed in 
limited contexts where the supervisor meets a multi-pronged 
 
 197. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a)(3).  
 198. See, e.g., id. R. 5.1. 
 199. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265, 276 (2006) (noting that rules invoking 
the reasonableness of fees have no limiting principals on their face). 
 200. Model Rule 1.5(a)(3) allows for the consideration of “the fee customari-
ly charged in the locality for similar legal services.” MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.5(a)(3) (2010). 
 201. See Turow, supra note 45, at 36 (noting that the billable hour stand-
ard has proliferated so much that there are now firms that specialize in dis-
puting other firms’ hourly billing). 
 202. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 199, at 277. 
 203. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 5.2(a) (“A lawyer is bound by 
the Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at 
the direction of another person.”).  
 204. Id. R. 5.2(b) (emphasis added).  
 205. Id. R. 5.1(a) (emphasis added). 
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test, again contingent on what is “reasonable.”206 It is not clear 
if this lack of clarity in the firm context is deliberate. Regard-
less, it is enabling and provides cover against malpractice alle-
gations to law firms stretching ethical bounds. 
Second, even if the rules themselves were clearer, the bar 
has shown reluctance in disciplining lawyers at larger firms.207 
Some argue this is due to institutional biases in the type of 
complaints bar agencies choose to investigate or the severity of 
the sanctions they impose.208 Firm lawyers may also receive less 
formal public sanctions due to their ability to pay monetary 
fines and restitution. The bar associations of over twenty states 
provide “diversion” programs rather than formal disciplinary 
action to deal with lesser ethical violations.209 Participation in a 
diversion program is usually contingent on paying for this pro-
gram.210 Large firms and lawyers from large firms may also 
have more funds available to avoid or lessen disciplinary action 
through the prompt payment of restitution.211 
Third, discipline through the bar is relatively rare.212 This 
may be because the bar has limited resources.213 Generally 
 
 206. Id. R. 5.1(c) (“A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer’s viola-
tion of the Rules of Professional Conduct if: (1) the lawyer orders or, with 
knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or (2) the law-
yer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in 
which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the 
other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be 
avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.”). 
 207. See Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 4 n.30 (2007) (noting that the bar historically has 
disciplined lawyers at large law firms at much lower rates than their small 
firm counterparts and that large firm lawyers are subjected to relatively little 
public lawyer discipline). 
 208. Id. at 4. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See COLO. R. CIV. P. 251.13(d) (2012). 
 211. See, e.g., In re Edelman, No. SB-02-0095-D, 2002 Ariz. LEXIS 131, at 
*16 (Ariz. Aug. 7, 2002) (treating restitution as a mitigating factor when im-
posing discipline); In re Fischer, 89 P.3d 817, 821 (Colo. 2004) (same); In re 
Arabia, 19 P.3d 113, 118 (Kan. 2001) (same). 
 212. See Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems 2004, A.B.A., charts I, II 
(2005), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/discipline/04 
-full.authcheckdam.pdf (indicating that of the 127,171 complaints received in 
2004, only approximately 5,600 resulted in disciplinary action).  
 213. Bar’s Restructuring Plan Featured in ABA Article, N.H. BAR ASS’N 
(Sept. 6, 2002), www.nhbar.org/publications/archives/display-news-issue.asp 
?id=708 (noting the bar association’s volunteer, staff, and financial resources 
were “stretched too thin”). 
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speaking, the bar may have the staffing to investigate and pur-
sue only the most egregious complaints.214 
Fourth, the bar may be motivated to accommodate work-
place norms that it suspects are at odds with the core principles 
of professional responsibility.215 This may be due to limited re-
sources or a vested interest in constructing rules that protect 
its members from malpractice suits.216 Regardless, the bar’s 
ability to be a reliable barrier between the client and unethical 
lawyer behavior is compromised.  
Finally, even if the bar had strong motivation and more re-
sources at its disposal, it is not clear that it would be aware of 
the violations that are occurring. Under the current system, it 
is likely that violations are underreported because clients are 
not aware of how cases are run or the ethical obligations of 
lawyers, 217 and because lawyers internally lack motivation and 
perspective to come forward. Like law firms, the bar suffers 
from a deficit of information that severely limits its ability to 
perform its policing function.  
D. NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL LAWYERS 
AND FIRMS  
One solution to the ethical problems associated with the 
current private-practice model would be for individual lawyers 
to negotiate formal work agreements with their employers, ra-
ther than work in conditions that make it very difficult to effec-
tively and ethically perform their jobs.218 Indeed, associate 
committees in law firms seek to perform this function. Howev-
er, they are ineffective at combating internal pressures and 
norms that go beyond any individual law firm. As an initial 
matter, firm committees do not include many of the types of at-
torneys who work at firms, specifically contract and staff attor-
 
 214. Levin, supra note 207, at 3 n.28 (discussing how a diversion program 
lessens backlog of ethical investigations). 
 215. See, e.g., Hirshon, supra note 10. 
 216. N.H. BAR ASS’N, supra note 213 (noting the bar association’s volun-
teer, staff, and financial resources were “stretched too thin”). 
 217. See Report Card: Summary of Findings, HELP ABOLISH LEGAL TYR-
ANNY, http://www.halt.org/reform_projects/lawyer_accountability/report_card/ 
summary_of_findings.php ( last visited Mar. 3, 2012) (on file with Minnesota 
Law Review) (“Of that small subset of misconduct that does constitute a rule 
violation, Stanford Law Professor Deborah Rhode notes that the majority of it 
goes unreported. Clients frequently lack sufficient information or incentives to 
file grievances and many individuals have little understanding of their rights 
in disputes with lawyers.”). 
 218. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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neys. Secondly, these committees can only make suggestions to 
firms that are non-binding and ultimately place the party pro-
posing change in a vulnerable position.219 As such, they function 
as a very rough means for the firm to gauge and defuse associ-
ate discontent before it rises to a point where drastic measures, 
such as unionization or going to the press, are considered. The 
issues truly plaguing associates—overall hours requirements, 
training, responsibility, and the hours worked in a given day—
are only collaterally discussed.220 Instead, these committees are 
often limited to covering a narrow range of ancillary (though 
very nice) perks—like a lounge area, tech allowances, and in-
clusion of gym memberships.221  
In good economic times, when both attorneys and the firms 
have leverage, this type of a system can work as a temporary 
fix. But, without a union, all the perks and privileges negotiat-
ed by these committees are: (1) confined to associates and not 
all lawyers; (2) not rights but benevolent grants of benefits that 
are not guaranteed for any set period of time; and (3) limited to 
the bounds of a single law firm, leaving intact industry-wide 
pressures to offer clients labor-hostile services (such as twenty-
four-hour responsiveness).  
Times of economic pressure clarify the inherent power dy-
namic of the law firm institution. Indeed, all attorneys at the 
firm, with the exception of equity partners, are at-will employ-
ees.222 Because they can be terminated at any time, there is a 
strong disincentive for such attorneys to bargain for changes 
that the firm, as an institution, might truly resist (such as a 
cap on the number of work hours in a day).223 In tight economic 
 
 219. Cf. Tiffani N. Darden, The Law Firm Caste System: Constructing a 
Bridge Between Workplace Equity Theory & the Institutional Analyses of Bias 
in Corporate Law Firms, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 85, 97–98 (2009) 
(noting one associate’s experience with associate committees in the context of 
diversity initiatives, because “issues go unaddressed” and there is a desire not 
to “make waves”). 
 220. See, e.g., Jill Schachner Chanen, You Rang, Sir?, 86 A.B.A. J. 82, 84 
(2000) (describing issues raised by one associates committee as “adding juices 
to its array of free beverages to loosening the vacation policies so that lawyers 
do not get docked for exceeding their allotted vacation time, given the amount 
of hours they work”). 
 221. On occasion these discussions turn to more substantive topics such as 
mentoring, leave policies, or diversity initiatives; however, associate input in 
these contexts is advisory and often concessions gained are symbolic or only 
occur in response to client or other market forces. See id. 
 222. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 223. For a discussion of changes that firms may strongly resist for econom-
ic purposes, see supra Part I. 
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times, the firm would just refuse the request and the only re-
course for the attorneys would be to quit, since pressing the 
matter would be to risk their jobs. Simply put, for associates in 
particular, the current incentive structure provides no reason 
to rock the boat. Attorneys staying at the firm need to make 
partner under unclear and often malleable standards that are 
inevitably colored by how colleagues and, specifically, superiors 
feel about a given attorney. While associates not aiming for 
partnership have no long-term commitment to the firm, they 
still need recommendations and professional connections mov-
ing forward. Thus their personal interests are not aligned with 
pursuing institutional change. Law students entering the re-
cruitment process have attempted to encourage labor changes 
voluntarily, but this has not led to reforms.224 
E. MAKE AGREEMENTS AMONGST JUNIOR LAWYERS AT FIRMS 
Another potential solution would be for firm lawyers, most 
likely associates across firms, to meet together and make 
agreements about the proper treatment of lawyers in the work-
place, hours, pay, other benefits and working conditions. The 
attorneys would then approach their respective firms with that 
proposal. If the firms disagreed with those terms, then associ-
ates at every firm would agree to respond by refusing to work. 
If the partners agreed, every firm would inform its clients that 
the firms’ rates and the way work would be structured would be 
changing and that all firms would be bound by similar labor 
limitations.225 Without the collective bargaining structure of a 
union, however, federal antitrust laws bar such action.  
The Supreme Court dealt with the issue of attorney 
agreements and boycotts directly in FTC v. Superior Court Tri-
al Lawyers Association.226 This case involved a group of trial 
lawyers who regularly accepted court appointments in Wash-
 
 224. In 2007, a group of Stanford law students wrote and circulated a white 
paper to law firm hiring partners regarding the negative effects of increasing 
billable hour requirements at private law firms and seeking a better quality of 
life as related to billable hours. Our Mission, BUILDING A BETTER LEGAL 
PROF., http://www.betterlegalprofession.org/mission.php ( last visited Apr. 16, 
2012). This paper received significant media buzz. Id. However, it did not 
change or alter firm practices. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 225. Since the reputation of a firm and the expertise they could claim 
would not necessarily be equal, this would not mean rate packages would nec-
essarily be the same. What it would mean, however, is that no firm would be 
able to work their staff beyond a given number of hours in a day and would 
have to adjust the management of cases and the intake of cases accordingly. 
 226. 493 U.S. 411, 412 (1990). 
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ington, D.C., to provide criminal defense services to indigent 
clients.227 The attorneys felt they were underpaid and agreed 
through their professional association to refuse to take on addi-
tional criminal defense cases until the legislature increased 
their hourly pay.228 When the District of Columbia failed to pass 
legislation increasing the attorneys’ fees, the lawyers refused to 
take new cases.229 The system was paralyzed and within two 
weeks the city council voted for the increase.230 Then, despite 
resolution of the issue, the FTC sued the lawyers with allega-
tions of price fixing and won.231 Since the attorneys were not 
collectively bargaining, their agreement was viewed as an anti-
trust violation.232 Subsequently, no lawyer agreements of this 
kind have been attempted. 
F. MAKE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN FIRMS REGARDING LABOR 
NORMS FOR LAWYERS 
As a threshold matter, discussions between law firms to 
agree on the cost and structure of labor would almost undoubt-
edly fail as an antitrust violation.233 However, even were such 
discussions legal, institutional norms of the law firm world 
pressure partners away from adopting that course of action. 
For a partner to state an interest in creating a labor system 
where lawyers work less per day would be to admit an inability 
to “play on the level” of other firms that would not agree to 
such coddling and pampering.234 In the big law world, there is 
enormous pressure to appear tough and invincible; a law firm 
lawyer must be able to handle anything, anywhere, under any 
conditions. Going to other firms with a set of labor norms that 
undermines this modern “I can do anything and give up any-
thing for my client” mentality would equate to saying “I don’t 
belong in the big leagues.” Thus, the new institutionalist 
framework suggests that partners see certain options, like a 
 
 227. Id. at 415. 
 228. Id. at 415–16. 
 229. Id. at 416. 
 230. Id. at 417–18. 
 231. Id. at 418–21, 436 (vacating the appellate court’s finding that the at-
torneys’ boycott was protected by the First Amendment based on freedom of 
expression). 
 232. Id. at 428 (“[The attorneys’] concerted action in refusing to accept fur-
ther [criminal defense] assignments until their fees were increased was thus a 
plain violation of the antitrust laws.”). 
 233. Cf. id. (preventing price fixing between lawyers and legislature). 
 234. See supra Part I.B (discussing general practices at law firms). 
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ten-hour workday, as choices that are unavailable to them.235 
Because that could mean the loss of business and prestige, 
much of what partners have worked and sacrificed for their en-
tire careers, such options are virtually unimaginable. 
The irony is that this type of law firm culture obscures the 
main function of a lawyer—to advise the client. The advice eve-
ry law firm should be giving their clients is that a tired, over-
worked, unhappy lawyer is a dangerous one, a bad one. No one 
would dispute that a worker wielding a blowtorch on her seven-
teenth hour in the day, on the third day in a row of sleeping 
fewer than six hours, is a liability—both dangerous and cost-
ly.236 But working in precisely those kinds of conditions has be-
come relatively commonplace in law firms, and nearly every 
lawyer has had something like that experience at some point in 
his or her career.237 Law firms often seem blind to the dangers 
of having exhausted and depressed lawyers making pivotal de-
cisions for clients.238 Attorneys should tell clients, “there are 
working hours in the day, let’s work during those and I’ll an-
swer the rest of your questions with a clear and sound mind 
tomorrow.”239 But sadly, law firms, as institutions, both inter-
nally and vis-à-vis each other, do not allow partners to do this. 
IV.  UNIONIZATION AS THE SOLUTION   
Having examined other options, it seems clear that unioni-
zation is the most effective way private-sector attorneys can 
overcome institutional and legal obstacles and combat the ethi-
cal problems inherent in private practice today. Specifically, 
unionization overcomes obstacles to institutional change by 
eliminating the need for individual actors to become agents for 
 
 235. See GORDON, supra note 18, at 17. 
 236. See UNIV. OF CAL., SAN DIEGO, supra note 107 (declaring the dimin-
ished ability to form tasks when deprived of sleep). 
 237. See supra notes 49–60 and accompanying text. 
 238. For many firm lawyers an eight-hour day would be incomprehensible; 
therefore this amount of time might be settled at ten hours or even more. In 
terms of morale, what some lawyers resent is not purely the length of hours 
but the haphazard nature of the hours and resulting inability to plan their day 
effectively. See Owen Kelly, Coping with Stress and Avoiding Burnout: Tech-
niques for Lawyers, CANADIAN B. ASS’N, http://www.cba.org/cba/practicelink/ 
bwl/stresscoping.aspx ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (stating that “daunting billa-
ble hour targets, unpredictable schedules and unreasonable clients—all of 
which can seem inescapable, uncontrollable and unremitting” provide stress-
ors for lawyers). 
 239. Ironically, clients themselves may also appreciate a respite from work 
issues being present twenty-four hours a day.  
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that change. For the reasons discussed above, law firms, as en-
tities, and law firm partners, in particular, will not take actions 
that they view as potentially harmful to their standing with 
clients in relation to other firms. Therefore, only limitations 
that apply across firms and to clients, regardless of which law 
firm they select, will actually change the institutional structure 
of firms. 
As discussed earlier, two main facilitators of unethical be-
havior in private practice are systemic: (1) firms have highly 
leveraged associate-to-partner ratios, leading to little training, 
poor oversight, and a lack of agency and decision making on the 
part of non-partners;240 and (2) firms use a billable hour system 
that pressures all parties to maximize billable hours.241 Unioni-
zation would counter both of these problems. First, in terms of 
leverage, union contracts would likely change at-will employees 
into employees requiring formal termination proceedings, sev-
erance packages, and other job loss compensation. This would 
encourage firms to hire people they plan to retain, lowering the 
partner-to-junior lawyer ratio and encouraging investment in 
training and retention. Turnover would likely be lower. These 
changes would create a work environment that better fosters 
diligence, competence (both technical and advisory), loyalty, 
and confidentiality.  
In relation to billable hours, a union that includes associ-
ates from all or most law firms could demand reforms of billa-
ble structures to make them more reasonable, attainable, and 
amenable to ethical legal work. Specifically, a private-attorney 
union could demand different minimum billable targets; set 
overall billable maximums; include firm activities, professional 
development, and training as part of billable hours; set maxi-
mum working hours and regular break times and durations; 
and negotiate for additional breaks or other time off for occa-
sional overtime scenarios. Currently, no formal limits on the 
billable hour are in place beyond the number of hours in a 
day.242 However, with limitations on the manner in which time 
could be billed, the systemic incentives to inflate time could be 
eliminated and replaced by an emphasis on efficiency, the qual-
 
 240. See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Law Firm Leverage 
Drops to Levels Last Seen 10 Years Ago (Dec. 18, 2007), available at http:// 
www.nalp.org/lawfirmleveragedrops (stating leverage ratios by firm size and 
office location). 
 241. See Turow, supra note 45, at 34–36. 
 242. See Holmen, supra note 74. 
 1526 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:1482 
 
ity of work, and strategic decision making. Unionization is the 
only way for attorneys from different firms or companies to 
meaningfully negotiate for the binding contracts that would 
give them the leverage with firms and clients to change how 
the billable hour is used. Only by controlling labor conditions 
and the maximum billable hours in a given day, week, or 
month can lawyers reclaim their professionalism, sense of self-
worth, and capacity to render good judgments.  
A. THERE ARE NO LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO ATTORNEY 
UNIONIZATION 
Since relatively few attorneys have unionized, one might 
wonder if it is illegal for attorneys to do so. This Section out-
lines how private-sector lawyers can lawfully unionize and why 
doing so would be to their advantage. Forming a union provides 
unparalleled legal protection and leverage for the workers  
involved. 
1. Lawyers Can Unionize Legally 
The legal process of unionization can accommodate law-
yers.243 The core of federal labor law is the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA), passed in 1935.244 The NLRA granted “em-
ployees” the rights to self-organize; to form, join, and assist 
labor organizations; and to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives.245 It also created the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) to administer and adjudicate employment mat-
ters.246 To form a union, a group must be certified by a local 
NLRB office247 as a valid “bargaining unit” under the NLRA.248 
Later, Congress amended the NLRA to explicitly cover “profes-
sional employees.”249  
 
 243. There are many other professional unions, for example, the Office and 
Professional Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, the Marine Engineers’ 
Beneficial Association, and the Union of American Physicians and Dentists. 
 244. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006); see also 
FRED WITNEY & BENJAMIN J. TAYLOR, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 13 (7th ed. 
1996) (confirming that the year of passage was 1935). 
 245. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (stating the federal statutes appli-
cable to labor relations). 
 246. See id. § 153(a) (establishing the NLRB as the agency to administer 
the NLRA). 
 247. See id. § 153(b) (authorizing delegation of power to regional offices 
and directors). 
 248. Id. § 159(b). 
 249. See id. § 152(12)(a) (defining a professional as “any employee engaged 
in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to 
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Moreover, as a matter of general law and as confirmed by 
the NLRB, lawyers in law firms and private corporations have 
the same rights as any other employees under the NLRA.250 The 
fact that lawyers are officers of the court in no way detracts 
from their protections under the NLRB.251 In Lumbermen’s Mu-
tual Casualty Co. of Chicago, the NLRB explicitly recognized 
an attorney’s right to unionize in the private sector.252 Existing 
case law adopts this standard and recognizes the legal right of 
the private sector to collective bargaining pursuant to the 
NLRA.253 Finally, since 1977, the NLRB has explicitly exercised 
jurisdiction over law firms that gross $250,000 or more.254  
Although relatively rare, lawyers are members in unions, 
and the NLRB has recognized such membership.255 Currently, 
 
routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involving the con-
sistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a 
character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be 
standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of 
an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a 
prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institu-
tion of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic 
education or from an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of 
routine mental, manual, or physical processes”); David M. Rabban, Distin-
guishing Excluded Managers from Covered Professionals Under the NLRA, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1775, 1794 (1989). 
 250. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers states that, “A law-
yer who hires a lawyer or nonlawyer as an employee is subject to applicable 
law governing the employment relationship, such as contract law, antidiscrim-
ination legislation, unjust-discharge law, and labor relations law.” RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 56(k) (2000); see also Kennedy, 
Schwartz & Cure, P.C., No. 2-RC-22718, slip op. at 24–25 (NLRB June 20, 
2003), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/2-RC-22718 (follow “View” hyper-
link to the right of “RD Decision and Order”) (rejecting law firms’ reasoning 
that lawyers should be treated differently than other groups of employees).  
 251. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. of Chi., 75 N.L.R.B. 1132, 1136–37 (1948). 
 252. See id. at 1137–39 (“That the attorneys have a statutory right to self-
organization cannot be denied.”); see also Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 97 
N.L.R.B. 929, 939 (1951) (ruling that nonprofessional and professional airline 
employees—including attorneys—may form a bargaining unit), overruled by 
Oregon Teamsters’ Sec. Plan Office, 113 N.L.R.B. 987, 991 n.7 (1955). 
 253. See Chiles v. State Emps. Attorneys Guild, 714 So. 2d 502, 505 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1998), aff ’d, Chiles v. State Emps. Attorneys Guild, 734 So. 2d 
1030, 1036 (Fla. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, N. Fla. Women’s Health & 
Counseling Servs. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2003).  
 254. David Van Os & Assocs., P.C., 346 N.L.R.B. 804, 808 (2006) (stating 
that gross receipts must exceed $250,000); Camden Reg’l Legal Servs., Inc., 
231 N.L.R.B. 224, 224 (1977) (setting income cap at $250,000); Foley, Hoag & 
Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. 456, 457 (1977) (establishing jurisdiction over law firms). 
 255. See, e.g., Wayne Cnty. Neighborhood Legal Servs., Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 
1023, 1024 (1977) (allowing a unit of staff attorneys). 
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there are also unionized lawyers who are part of broader un-
ions that include nonlawyers and other members of the same 
company.256 Notably, lawyer unionization from the private sec-
tor is beginning to gain more traction. In 2003, a group of at-
torneys from Parker Stanbury LLP, a private Los Angeles-
based law firm, joined the Teamsters Union after failed discus-
sions regarding working conditions and pay.257 To date, no legal 
or disciplinary action on the part of the bar against the attor-
neys has been reported.  
2. Arguments Against Certifying Attorney Unions: The Law 
Firm’s Case 
While lawyers do have a right to unionize as a matter of 
law, law firms may challenge their status as employees under 
the NLRA.258 Law firms may also contest the formation of un-
ions of lawyers. Specifically, they may argue that unionization 
is unavailable to their associates, staff, and contract lawyers 
because they act as confidential employees, managerial em-
ployees, or supervisors, all of which are exempt from NLRA 
protections.259  
For several reasons, such claims would most likely fail. 
First, “confidential employees” is a term of art in labor law, de-
noting employees who have access to the confidential labor in-
formation of a company, and therefore would skew the collec-
 
 256. Kennedy, Schwartz & Cure, P.C., No. 2-RC-22718, slip op. at 25–29 
(NLRB June 20, 2003), http://www.nlrb.gov/case/2-RC-22718 (follow “View” 
hyperlink to the right of “RD Decision and Order”) (ordering an election to 
choose between a unit of attorneys or of attorneys, secretaries, legal assis-
tants, receptionists, and bookers ordered); Am. Fed’n of State-Cnty.-Mun. 
Emps. Council 93, Case No. 1-RC-21569, at 9 (NLRB Dec. 5, 2002), http://www 
.nlrb.gov/case/1-RC-21569 (follow “View” hyperlink to the right of “RD Deci-
sion and Order”) (ordering a self-determination election to determine if attor-
neys should be in a separate unit or in a unit including field staff representa-
tives, senior field staff representatives, and organizers); cf. Lumbermen’s Mut. 
Cas. Co. of Chi., 75 N.L.R.B. at 1138–39 (approving a separate unit for attor-
neys employed by an insurance company). 
 257. Ryan F. Gabrielson, Lawyers Set Precedent, Join Teamsters Union, 
ARIZ. BUS. GAZETTE (Mar. 27, 2003, 12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/ 
abgnews/articles/0327union27.html?&wired (noting the unionization of the 
firm’s Phoenix office). 
 258. Laura Midwood & Amy Vitacco, The Right of Attorneys to Unionize, 
Collectively Bargain, and Strike: Legal and Ethical Considerations, 18 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 299, 303 (2000).  
 259. Parties asserting such claims bear the burden of proof. See LeMoyne-
Owen Coll., 345 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1128 (2005). 
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tive bargaining process.260 In 2003, the NLRB rejected outright 
the claim that lawyers act as confidential employees, and it is 
unlikely to reverse its position.261 
Courts are also unlikely to exclude non-partner law firm 
lawyers from unionization by classifying them as “managerial 
employees.” Although the NLRA does not contain the term 
“managerial employees,”262 the Supreme Court defined the term 
to include employees who “formulate and effectuate manage-
ment policies by expressing and making operative the decisions 
of their employer.”263 In implementing this exclusion, the NLRB 
and subsequent courts have found that it does not apply to 
rank-and-file employees with routine duties,264 but only to ex-
ecutives,265 whose duties are “outside the scope of duties rou-
tinely performed by a similarly situated professional.”266 Were it 
otherwise, “the managerial exclusion . . . would sweep all pro-
fessionals outside the Act in derogation of Congress’ expressed 
intent to protect them.”267  
The key factor in determining whether an individual is ex-
empted from NLRB protections as a “managerial employee” is 
whether the party involved may make discretionary decisions 
on his or her own regarding company policy.268 Although the 
NLRB has not addressed this issue in relation to private-sector 
lawyers, it is longstanding precedent that staff doctors and 
 
 260. Mitchell H. Rubenstein, Attorney Labor Unions, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., 
Jan. 2007, at 23, 23–24.  
 261. See Kennedy, Schwartz & Cure, P.C., Case No. 2-RC-22718, at 22 n.12 
(rejecting law firms reasoning that lawyers were excluded from unions as “con-
fidential employees”). 
 262. While the Act is silent on this point, the legislative history of the Act 
indicates that such employees were meant to be excluded. ROBERT A. GORMAN 
& MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW § 3.7 (2d ed. 2004). 
 263. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 288 (1974) (quoting Palace 
Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947)). 
 264. Evergreen Am. Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.3d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 265. Bell Aerospace Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 384, 385–86 (1975). 
 266. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 690 (1980); Nurses United, 338 
N.L.R.B. 837, 840 (2003). 
 267. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 690. 
 268. Id. at 683 (stating a key factor in this determination is whether an 
employee “represents management interests by taking or recommending dis-
cretionary actions that effectively control or implement employer policy”); 
LeMoyne-Owen Coll., 345 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1128–29 (2005) (holding that faculty 
were managerial employees because they effectively make decisions in critical 
areas such as curriculum, course content, determination of honors, grading, 
admission standards, and participation in tenure decisions).  
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dentists are not excludable as managerial employees.269 This is 
relevant because staff doctors and dentists, like the general 
non-partner attorney pool at a law firm, are professionals with 
professional obligations who have historically had autonomy 
over their work and oversight over other semiprofessionals 
(such as nurses or technical assistants).270 However, the legal 
consideration in determining managerial status is whether an 
employee—professional or not—has discretionary authority 
over company policy and not just over matters within his or her 
limited sphere of influence, even where such influence requires 
considerable professional training or expertise.271 A key eviden-
tiary factor that the NLRB considers in a managerial employee 
inquiry is whether there are “comprehensive manuals and in-
structions” limiting discretion.272 Most law firms have practice 
manuals delineating procedures for dealing both with intra-
firm matters and with clients or the media.273 Because associ-
ates, staff, and contract attorneys working for firms exercise 
limited discretion in routine situations, within the confines of 
firm protocols and reviews, the managerial exception will most 
likely not apply.  
The best argument that law firms have against associate 
unionization is that associates act as supervisory employees.274 
 
 269. Third Coast Emergency Physicians, P.A., 330 N.L.R.B. 756, 756 (2000) 
(finding that “ultimate decision-making authority . . . is retained by the two 
medical directors rather than the physicians”); Montefiore Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 
261 N.L.R.B. 569, 571–72 (1982) (refusing to find “that the managerial partic-
ipation . . . so aligns the staff doctors with management or places them suffi-
ciently within the managerial structure as to warrant their exclusion”). But 
see Chief Judge of the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit v. Ill. State Labor Relations 
Bd., 687 N.E.2d 795, 799 (Ill. 1997) (holding that government attorneys—
assistant public defenders—were managerial employees and therefore not sub-
ject to the collective bargaining provisions of the Illinois Public Labor Rela-
tions Act). 
 270. See Montefiore, 261 N.L.R.B. at 572 (holding that while doctors per-
formed some managerial duties, those duties did not “fall outside the profes-
sional duties primarily incident to patient care”). 
 271. Id. at 570 (“As professional employees, the doctors may also be mana-
gerial, but their managerial status may not be based on decision making 
which is part of the routine discharge of professional duties.”). 
 272. Bell Aerospace Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 384, 386 (1975). 
 273. See T. Jackson Bedford Jr., Managing by Manual, 77 A.B.A. J. 103, 
103 (1991) (declaring a law firm manual to be “as indispensable as a computer 
system for law office management”  because a manual “details the day-to-day 
policies and procedures to be followed . . . by staff and attorneys” and thereby 
“reduces the time spent by lawyers in managing”). 
 274. Notably, few of these arguments hold water in relation to staff attor-
neys or contract attorneys who, due to their transient and uncertain employ-
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Originally, the NLRA took an expansive view of the term em-
ployee, but Congress revised that view in the Taft-Hartley Act 
of 1947, divesting supervisory employees of NLRA protec-
tions.275 Today, supervisors are still specifically excluded from 
the NLRA’s protections.276 Ironically, while the NLRA explicitly 
defines the term “supervisory employee,” application of the 
term has been highly contested. The Supreme Court has stated 
that, to be a supervisory employee, a worker must: (1) partici-
pate in one of twelve activities specifically enumerated in the 
NLRA;277 (2) exercise independent judgment;278 and (3) hold the 
authority in the interest of the employer.279 Participation in a 
single supervisory activity establishes supervisory status if in-
dependent authority is wielded in the interest of the employer.280  
In 2006, the NLRB issued a series of three administrative 
decisions aimed at clarifying the scope of the supervisory excep-
tion.281 These cases currently define what it means to assign 
 
ment status, are not placed in supervisory roles, even over nonlegal staff. See 
Chief Judge of the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, 687 N.E.2d at 801 (holding that 
although public defenders were managerial employees, that classification 
should not be interpreted to mean all publicly employed attorneys are deemed 
managerial employees, but should be limited to only those attorneys with a 
similar amount of discretion and control).  
 275. See 29 U.S.C. § 52 (2006) (declaring that injunctive relief in employ-
ment cases should not be granted unless absolutely necessary); N.L.R.B. v. Ky. 
River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 717–18 (2001) (discussing history of the 
supervisory exclusion). 
 276. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). 
 277. The twelve statutory activities are the ability: 
to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, 
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, 
or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, 
if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is 
not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of in-
dependent judgment.  
29 U.S.C. § 152(11). 
 278. NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. 511 U.S. 571, 589 (1994). 
 279. Id. at 573–74. 
 280. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. NLRB, 271 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 
2001) (declaring that “the existence of any one of the listed powers, as long as 
it involves the use of independent judgment, is sufficient to support a deter-
mination of supervisory status”); Bryant Health Ctr., Inc., 353 N.L.R.B. No. 
80, 742 (Jan. 30, 2009) (finding that the twelve statutory acts are meant to be 
read disjunctively); Fred Meyer Alaska, Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 646, 649 (2001) 
(holding that “a person needs to possess only one of the specific criteria 
listed”). 
 281. See Croft Metals, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 717, 717 (2006) (noting that the 
Croft Metals, Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., and Golden Crest cases were filed to-
gether to determine the “supervisory issues on review”); Golden Crest 
Healthcare Ctr., 348 N.L.R.B. 727, 727 (2006) (calling the three companion 
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work, direct another employee, and act with independent 
judgment.282 Although these cases leave open the question of 
whether associates at law firms would be viewed as supervisors 
under the law, they are by no means clearly dispositive in the 
negative. Rather, recent NLRB decisions show that the super-
visory exception will not be interpreted so broadly as to over-
whelm the inclusion of all professionals under NLRA.283 Since 
the party seeking to prove supervisory status bears the burden 
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence,284 a law firm seek-
ing to prevent its associates from unionizing would have to 
show that the associates in question acted as supervisors. Giv-
en that analogous employment case law holds that even law 
firm partners do not necessarily exercise sufficient control over 
firm matters to be excluded from employment law protection,285 
this burden may prove difficult to meet. This is particularly so 
where changes to federal pleading standards, requiring more 
specific pleadings, are also limiting how many claims go to 
court.286 
 
cases “identical filings” to clarify Section 2(11) of the NLRA); Oakwood 
Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 686 (2006) (characterizing the decision as 
an attempt to come up with a method for interpreting Section 2(11) of the 
NLRA). 
 282. See Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. at 689–94 (discussing 
those three key phrases in depth); see also Golden Crest, 348 N.L.R.B. at 727 
(adopting Oakwood’s standards and exploring them in different factual scenar-
ios); Croft Metals, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. at 718–19 (focusing on assignment and 
direction).  
 283. Bryant Health Ctr., Inc., 353 N.L.R.B. at 742–45 (rejecting claim that 
licensed nurse practitioners at a nursing home were supervisors exempt from 
protection under the NLRA).  
 284. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. at 686–87 (stating that the 
party asserting a supervisory authority claim bears the burden of proof ); Dean 
& Deluca New York, Inc., 338 N.L.R.B. 1046, 1047 (2003) (stating that the 
party asserting a supervisory status must establish that fact by a preponder-
ance of the evidence). 
 285. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 
2002) (finding that Sidley Austin’s arguments that partners were employers 
and not employees were unconvincing given the relative lack of authority the 
partners wield on behalf of the firm).  
 286. Roger Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things to Come: The Great Split 
Between Federal and State Pleading Standards, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 
120 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/10/27/michalski.html (discussing 
the implications of recent changes in federal pleading standards in state 
courts for civil rights and employment discrimination cases). 
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3. Activity by State Bars 
The legitimacy of unionization is confirmed by the fact 
that, in the limited cases where lawyers have unionized, they 
were not disbanded by the state or local bar. In a 1975 opinion, 
the New York County Bar Association’s Committee on Legal 
Ethics (NY Committee) considered whether a strike by union-
ized Legal Aid Lawyers was ethical under the New York Code 
of Professional Responsibility (New York Code).287 The NY 
Committee did not question, indeed it assumed, (1) the legal 
right of attorneys to form unions and (2) the legal right of those 
unions to strike.288 The NY Committee found that in exercising 
these legal rights, lawyers maintained an obligation during the 
strike not to disrupt the proceedings of the court or deprive 
their clients of proper representation and a speedy trial, which 
in this specific case was found improper.289 However, subse-
quent strikes have proceeded without ethical action from the 
state bar.290 Moreover, in later decisions, the NY Committee de-
fended and expanded the right of attorneys to join unions by al-
lowing attorneys to join unions that include nonlawyers.291  
B. THERE ARE NO FORMAL ETHICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO 
ATTORNEY UNIONIZATION 
One critique of lawyers joining or forming unions is that, 
by doing so, they would violate the rules of professional ethics. 
Specifically, the concern is that zealous, competent, and dili-
gent representation will be neglected in service of labor goals 
and union activity.292 This Section makes clear that: (1) the 
 
 287. N.Y. Cnty. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 645, 1 (1975). 
 288. Id. at 2.  
 289. Id. at 4.  
 290. See Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be 
Compelled to Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363, 
395–96 (1993) (noting that in October 1982, the Legal Aid Society in New York 
conducted a successful ten-week strike that ended in a favorable contractual 
settlement); see generally NY Legal Aid Lawyers Return, 147 LAB. REL. REP. 
221, 221 (1994) (reporting on the New York Legal Aid Society’s 1994 strike).  
 291. N.Y. State Bar, Op. 578 (Dec. 4, 1986), available at http://www.nysba 
.org/AM/PrinterTemplate.cfm?Section=ethics_opinions&ContentID=55423& 
template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm (upholding the right of an attorney to join 
a union even if the union has nonlawyer members, provided that the lawyer 
does not represent the State in disciplinary proceedings in certain situations). 
 292. The argument that unionization is incompatible with professional 
values is longstanding, though not as specifically applied to lawyers. Henry 
Mintzberg, A Note on the Unionization of Professionals from the Perspective of 
Organization Theory, 5 INDUS. RELATIONS L.J. 623, 631–32 (1983).  
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rules of ethics allow attorney unionization; (2) existing court 
and administrative decisions affirm that there is no conflict be-
tween a lawyer’s professional responsibility and unionization; 
and (3) a lawyer may be ethically obligated to pursue better 
working conditions since they are intimately related to the abil-
ity to serve the client.  
1. The Rules of Ethics Allow Attorney Unionization 
Current interpretations of the Model Code clearly permit 
attorney unionization.293 This is notable because the ABA 
Commission on Ethics opposed unionization of attorneys until 
as recently as 1967.294 When the Model Code was adopted, the 
ABA Commission revisited the issue of attorney membership in 
unions and took a more expansive and permissive approach.295 
In Informal Opinion 1325, the Commission stated that Ethical 
Consideration 5-13 (EC 5-13) under the ABA Model Code pro-
vides guidance concerning union membership.296 EC 5-13  
provides: 
A lawyer should not maintain membership in or be influenced by any 
organization of employees that undertakes to prescribe, direct, or 
suggest when or how he should fulfill his professional obligations to a 
person or organization that employs him as a lawyer. Although it is 
not necessarily improper for a lawyer employed by a corporation or 
similar entity to be a member of an organization of employees, he 
should be vigilant to safeguard his fidelity as a lawyer to his employ-
er, free from outside influences.297 
Although the opinion acknowledged potential tension be-
tween certain union activity and disciplinary rules, it did not 
find striking to be categorically unethical.298 Rather, the Com-
 
 293. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1325 
(1975) (interpreting ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-13).  
 294. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 986 
(1967) (holding that salaried, employee-lawyers could join a union or organiza-
tion—comprised entirely of lawyers working for the same employer—to nego-
tiate wages and working conditions, but that they could not strike or withhold 
their services); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 
917 (1966) (stating the fear was that through union membership the lawyer 
would be “surrendering his independent judgment” and would become “subject 
to the direction of the union and its officers”). 
 295. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 
1325 (1975) (“[L]awyers are not forbidden per se to belong to un-
ions . . . . Earlier pre-Code opinions took a somewhat different view.”). 
 296. See id. 
 297. MODEL CODE OF PROF ’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-13 (1983). 
 298. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1325 
(1975). 
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mission set forth a fact-specific inquiry that pragmatically 
weighs the strike’s actual impact on client representation.299 
This inquiry provides a pragmatic framework, allowing state 
bars to differ over the ethics of any particular attorney strike 
depending on the given circumstances.300 
2. Case Law and Administrative Decisions Support a Lawyer’s 
Right to Unionize 
Moreover, existing case law rejects the assertion that there 
is an ethical bar to lawyers forming unions. Specifically, courts 
have held that attorneys suing for wages or other conditions of 
employment do not violate their duty of loyalty.301 Santa Clara 
County Counsel Attorneys Association v. Woodside is particular-
ly notable for the purpose of considering whether a court would 
view union activity as unethical. In Santa Clara, public sector 
lawyers sued to enforce their rights to bargain collectively un-
der statutory law.302 The court in Santa Clara found that such 
suits do not categorically undermine a lawyer’s traditional duty 
of loyalty or “any other ethical obligation” owed to the lawyer’s 
employer or client.303 Rather, the court recognized that “[t]he 
growing phenomenon of the lawyer/employee requires a realis-
tic accommodation between an attorney’s professional obliga-
tions and the rights he or she may have as an employee.”304 
The NLRB has separately concluded that there is no con-
flict between union membership and a lawyer’s professional du-
ties. Repeatedly, the NLRB has rejected the allegation that un-
ion activity is professionally irresponsible or unethical.305 In 
 
 299. See id. (noting that neglecting a legal matter could require discipline, 
but in other cases a strike may be “no more disruptive of the performance of 
legal work than taking a two week vacation”).  
 300. See, e.g., N.Y. Cnty. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 645, 1–4 
(1975) (finding a strike by a union of legal aid lawyers to be unethical when it 
impedes the administration of justice); Mendecino Public Attorneys Strike, 
CAL. REP. (Mar. 8, 2007), http://www.californiareport.org/archive/R703080850 
(reporting an attorney strike in California where no subsequent bar discipli-
nary measures were taken). 
 301. E.g., Santa Clara Cnty. Counsel Attorneys Ass’n v. Woodside, 869 
P.2d 1142, 1157–58 (Cal. 1994). 
 302. Id.  
 303. Id. at 1157. 
 304. Id. 
 305. See Kennedy, Schwartz & Cure, P.C., No. 2-RC-22718, slip op. at 20–
25 (N.L.R.B. 2003), http://www.nlrb.gov/case/2-RC-22718 (follow “View” hyper-
link to the right of “RD Decision and Order”); Foley Hoag & Eliot, 229 
N.L.R.B. 456, 457–58 n.12 (1977); Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. of Chic., 75 
N.L.R.B. 1132, 1140 (1948). 
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examining EC 5-13,306 the NLRB explicitly considered and re-
jected the assertion that membership in a union undermines a 
lawyer’s ability to act free of outside influence on his or her cli-
ent’s behalf.307  
3. An Affirmative Ethical Obligation to Strike? Attorney and 
Client Interests Are Aligned in Relation to Working Conditions 
The creation of a fair workplace with a reasonable work-
load and transparent work structure is actually aligned with, 
rather than opposed to, a lawyer’s ethical obligations to a cli-
ent. The Model Code requires that “[a] lawyer shall 
not . . . [n]eglect a legal matter entrusted to [him/her].”308 It also 
states that “[a] lawyer shall not . . . [h]andle a legal matter 
which he[/she] knows or should know that he[/she] is not com-
petent to handle . . . .”309 Indeed, the New York Code makes 
clear that lawyers unable to render adequate legal representa-
tion to their clients must withdraw.310 Like the Model Code, 
these rules forbid a lawyer from “handl[ing]“ a legal matter 
which the lawyer knows or should know that he or she is not 
competent to handle,”311 and from “hand[ling] a legal matter 
“without preparation adequate in the circumstances.”312  
Poor working conditions embedded in current firm labor 
practices undermine lawyers’ abilities to meet these obligations 
because they are too tired, ill-informed, dissatisfied, and disil-
lusioned to behave truly professionally or ethically. Indeed, the 
current system breeds inadequate preparation—sloppiness, 
loss of judgment and skill due to overwork, and self-
aggrandizement prioritized over candor—none of which bene-
fits the client, the court, or the profession.  
Under conditions that make ethical representation impos-
sible, some courts have found that it is appropriate, even ethi-
cal, to withhold representation. For example, in New Orleans, 
public defender Rick Teissier refused to go to trial when there 
 
 306. MODEL CODE OF PROF ’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-13 (1983). 
 307. Kennedy, Schwartz & Cure, P.C., No. 2-RC-22718, at 10–25.  
 308. MODEL CODE OF PROF ’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A). 
 309. Id. 
 310. “A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission 
if required by its rules, shall withdraw from employment . . . if . . . [t]he lawyer 
knows or it is obvious that continued employment will result in violation of a 
Disciplinary Rule.” N.Y. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(2) 
(2007). 
 311. Id. DR 6-101(A)(1). 
 312. Id. DR 6-101(A)(2). 
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was not enough money available to fund a necessary expert 
witness.313 Then, after considering briefing on the issue, the 
court reversed a finding of contempt and instead ordered a 
structural overhaul of the public defender system on grounds 
that the system was institutionally flawed.314  
The integrity of the lawyer as an employee and a person is 
irrevocably intertwined with broader interests, particularly cli-
ent interest. It is integrity in both mind and body that fortifies 
a lawyer so that he or she can exercise good judgment and be a 
loyal, diligent, discreet, and measured advisor. A client hires a 
lawyer to be a professional. When lawyers are not treated as 
professionals and no longer have the physical capacity to act 
with clarity, they do not act professionally.315 
Ultimately, the current firm work structure hampers a 
lawyer’s ability to fulfill his or her duties to clients and the 
courts and undermines the already poor standing of the legal 
profession in the public eye. If lawyers cannot act as profes-
sionals and thereby fulfill their duty to their clients, they have 
an ethical obligation to take measures to ensure that they can 
provide adequate representation and fulfill those duties. As 
discussed above, the only means to achieve this goal in the pri-
vate sector is for firm attorneys to unionize. Therefore, private-
sector attorneys have an ethical duty to unionize. 
C. ALL IMPEDIMENTS TO UNIONIZATION ARE CULTURAL AND 
THEREFORE NONBINDING  
The only actual barriers that exist to private attorney un-
ionization are cultural—in both the legal profession and society 
at-large. Like most professionals, lawyers have a culture and 
tradition of not unionizing.316 Unions are associated with blue-
collar positions and, to some extent, economic hardship, rather 
than workplace mistreatment.317 At first blush, the idea of un-
ionizing firm attorneys seems laughable. Firm attorneys, par-
ticularly associates, often feel ashamed that they are unhappy 
or have complaints regarding their jobs because of their high 
 
 313. Mark Hansen, P.D. Funding Struck Down, 78 A.B.A. J. 10, 18 (1992). 
 314. Id. 
 315. Cf. Schiltz, supra note 5, at 729 (explaining how the professional dis-
satisfaction can lead to unethical behavior by young attorneys). 
 316. See CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? THE REJUVENATION 
OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 54 (1995). 
 317. Cf. id. (describing the characterization of American unions as “lower 
class”). 
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salaries.318 However, it is well known among attorneys that 
firm lawyers tend to be profoundly unhappy, largely due to the 
long hours, the insecurity of their job positions, the lack of 
ownership in their jobs, and a sense that they went to law 
school to be a lawyer, not a widget.319 
Previously, a lack of willpower and willingness to break 
with convention rendered the likelihood of unionization low.320 
However, the current economic downturn in the legal market 
and the accompanying sense of disenfranchisement that law-
yers are experiencing may provide the needed impetus to push 
private attorneys to action. Unions in the United States have a 
long history of being forged in the fires of economic turmoil.321 
Indeed, it is in the moments when labor is weakest that collec-
tive action provides the most meaningful way to negotiate for 
improved working conditions.322  
D. HOW UNIONS WILL BALANCE FIRM INSTITUTIONS AND 
FOSTER PROFESSIONALISM 
The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act added a provision to the NLRA 
stating that the duty to bargain requires the parties to meet 
and “confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and oth-
er terms and conditions of employment.”323 There are many is-
sues that a firm lawyer union could pursue as a basic contract 
platform. Specifically, a union of law firm lawyers could negoti-
ate to set reasonable hours’ targets, a maximum number of 
hours that may be worked in a given day, and a total number of 
hours worked in a given week or thirty-six hour period.324 A un-
 
 318. Daniel Lukasik, How Stress and Anxiety Become Depression, LAWYERS 
WITH DEPRESSION (May 22, 2011), http://www.lawyerswithdepression.com/ 
articles/how-stress-and-anxiety-become-depression-2/.  
 319. See generally Schiltz, supra note 73, at 886 (discussing the high in-
stances of depression, anxiety, divorce, and job dissatisfaction amongst law-
yers and noting that for both associates and partners, “[ l]awyers in large law 
firms are often among the least happy” (citation omitted) (quotation omitted)). 
 320. See Eric E. Johnson, Law-Firm Associates Should Unionize, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 28, 2008), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/ 
02/law-firm-associ.html. 
 321. Key Events in Labor History, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/About/ 
Our-History/Key-Events-in-Labor-History ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012). 
 322. See, e.g., Labor History Timeline, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/ 
About/Our-History/Labor-History-Timeline ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012). 
 323. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d) (2006).  
 324. For a list of some of the potential benefits of lawyer unionization, see 
Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Attorney Labor Unions, 79 N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 23, 23 (2007).  
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ion could also negotiate for fixed required break times—for ex-
ample, break times would count as part of hours targets and 
would have to be scheduled in regularly, such as a half hour off 
for every five hours worked.325 
Related to this, a union could push to set clear policies on 
how much travel may be asked of a lawyer in any given twenty-
four hour period and what amount of rest is required after-
wards.326 Other issues to be considered might include salaries 
and contracts regarding sick leave and vacation time for non-
associate lawyers, as well as working conditions (e.g., crowding, 
lighting, equipment used in the workplace, and workplace-
related injuries)327 and granting vacation time for work on holi-
days.328 A union-negotiated contract could seek to explicitly lay 
out the circumstances under which an attorney has the right to 
refuse a work assignment and when overtime or additional 
compensation is required. A clear work contract could also lay 
out promotion and termination terms as well as compensation 
for termination.  
Beyond any one demand, unionization would have a posi-
tive effect on morale. First, morale would be improved by work-
ers having a sense of agency and security. It would give lawyers 
a sense of protection that would allow them to act definitively 
in favor of their clients’ interests. Second, by unifying all firm 
lawyer employees—from associates to contract attorneys—in a 
common set of rights, unionization would produce better team-
work and work product. Third, unionization would focus the 
competitive energy of attorneys on improving the quality of 
their work in the long-run, rather than merely attempting to 
survive from one case to the next. As such, time invested in ac-
quiring skills, developing specialized expertise, becoming 
measured advisors, participating in bar activities, and produc-
ing quality work would be viewed as essential, allowing attor-
neys to reconnect with a broader sense of professionalism.  
 
 325. See id. 
 326. See id. 
 327. Work-related injuries do occur in office settings but they are often the 
slow and gradual injuries of repetitive motions or poor working positions. Be-
yond typical slip and fall incidents or being injured while transporting evidence 
or documents, carpal tunnel, eye damage, and back issues are commonplace. 
WASH. INDUS. SAFETY & HEALTH ACT SERVS. DIV., WASH. STATE DEP’T OF LA-
BOR & INDUS., OFFICE ERGONOMICS: PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS FOR A SAFER WORK-
PLACE 3–4 (2002), available at http://www.lni.wa.gov/IPUB/417-133-000.pdf.  
 328. See id. 
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Unionization may also alleviate some of the confidentiality 
issues created by the increased use of contract attorneys. Spe-
cifically, if contract attorneys themselves were unionized, firms 
would be able to bargain for the creation of a database of mat-
ters that each attorney had worked on, a running conflicts list 
of sorts, for each union member. Unionization may also lead to 
the diminished use of contract attorneys. If unionized, contract 
attorneys would likely demand benefits, better work environ-
ments, and clearer contract terms. This would eliminate some 
of the motivations firms now have to hire contract attorneys in 
the first place: contract attorneys are attractive to firms in a 
large part because they are entirely fungible, the ultimate at-
will employees.329 With increased bargaining power, particular-
ly in a union aligned with associates, this balance will change, 
encouraging law firms to think long and hard about the role of 
contract attorneys in the firm structure.  
E. NO PLAUSIBLE ALTERNATIVE: WHY NOW? 
Since the financial sector crash of 2008, the balance of 
power between associates and law firms, and law firms and 
their clients, has shifted indelibly.330 Associates fear losing their 
jobs.331 New graduates and other laid-off attorneys flood the 
market with cheap contract or temporary labor.332 Partners feel 
additional pressure to bring in business (especially in firms 
that are not lockstep)333 and keep profits up.334 Some firms in 
 
 329. Kathryn M. Fenton, Use of Temporary or Contract Attorneys, 13 ANTI-
TRUST 23, 26 (1998) (characterizing the contract attorney-firm relationship as 
“inherently limited in nature”).  
 330. Law Shucks, a blog dedicated to large law firms, reports that between 
January 1, 2008, and December 11, 2011, over 15,435 people have been laid off 
by major law firms alone (5872 lawyers/9563 staff ). Layoff Tracker, LAW 
SHUCKS, http://lawshucks.com/layoff-tracker/ ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012). 
 331. See id. 
 332. See Matt Masich, Law School Career Offices Seek Fix for More Lawyers, 
Fewer Jobs, L. WEEK COLO. (Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.lawweekonline.com/ 
2009/10/career-offices-seek-fix-for-more-lawyers-fewer-jobs/ (on file with Minne-
sota Law Review) (discussing the impact of the recession on graduate recruit-
ment at a top fifty law school); Debra Cassens Weiss, Downturn’s Losers: 
BigLaw, ‘Entitled’ Associates, Top Schools, A.B.A. J. (May 7, 2009, 9:12 AM) 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/downturns_losers_biglaw_entitled_ass
ociates_top_schools (commenting on how the recession has affected the re-
cruitment of graduates of elite law schools). 
 333. “Lockstep” firms are firms where partners are compensated based on 
years in the partnership, rather than ability to bring in revenue. Although a 
historically prominent means of compensating lawyers in firms, it is now unu-
sual. See William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier Versus 
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this context sense an opportunity to maintain or increase their 
bottom line and regain control over the power dynamic between 
associates and the firm.335 As firms take steps to save money, 
the lawyer workforce may bear the burden. In particular, in 
this economic environment, law firms can avoid filling vacant 
positions and place heavier workloads on remaining associates, 
using an underclass of “staff attorneys” to do particularly repet-
itive and rote tasks, while filling in epic peaks of work (e.g., 
discovery periods) with the most fungible and transient of 
workforces—the contract attorney.336 
During the comfortable, pre-recession days, the forgiving 
benevolence of plenty masked the inherent and complete lack of 
power lawyers have in big law, because most lawyers had a 
trump card up their sleeves—most attorneys, and certainly as-
sociates or partners, could leave and get a job elsewhere. With 
this leverage gone, the true nature of the firm as an institution 
is apparent; firms are on a mission to generate maximum work 
output by all attorneys for the benefit of firm profit, without re-
gard for attorney wellbeing or compatibility with ethical prac-
tice. Ultimately, only unionization can break this cycle.337 Asso-
 
Two-Tier Partnerships in the Am Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1691, 1706–09 
(2005–2006) (documenting the growth of two-tier, non-lockstep, partnerships); 
James D. Cotterman, Lockstep Compensation. Does it Still Merit Considera-
tion? A.B.A. L. PRAC. TODAY (Aug. 2007), http://apps.americanbar.org/lpm/lpt/ 
articles/fin08071.shtml. 
 334. Amanda Ripley, Seniority Complex, AM. LAW., June 2000, at 84 (quot-
ing Sidley Austin executive committee chair Thomas Cole’s statement that the 
firm’s falling profits from the partnership ranks “could ultimately affect future 
retention and recruiting and possibly even the way prospective clients would 
assess the firm”).  
 335. Id. 
 336. Fenton, supra note 329, at 23. 
 337. A typical argument against unions is that they drive up costs and in-
centivize outsourcing. In this context, unionization may actually decrease 
costs as it may increase efficiency and allow associates to negotiate for lower 
pay in return for concessions regarding their hours. Furthermore, since attor-
ney unionization and strikes are far more typical abroad than domestically, 
outsourcing of legal work internationally would not allow firms to avoid deal-
ing with collective action by lawyers. See, e.g., Algerian Lawyers Strike 
Against ‘Repression,’ ASSOCIATED FREE PRESS (Oct. 25, 2011), 
www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hHmws44xml7FaHEk6M9FX
5RJ307w (Algeria); John Nalianya, CJ Mutunga Blamed for Lawyers’ Strike, 
NAIROBI STAR (January 11, 2012), http://allafrica.com/stories/201201120043 
.html (Kenya); John Spano, I ta l ian Lawyers Strike over New Mandatory Me-
diation, L. FORWARD (Mar. 14, 2011), http://lawforward.legalzoom.com/ 
competition/italian-lawyers-strike-over-new-mandatory-mediation-american 
-legal-pundits-pile-on-consumerism-debated/ (Italy); Lawyers’ Strike Cripples 
Delhi District Courts, TIMES OF INDIA (Jan. 12, 2012), http://timesofindia 
 1542 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:1482 
 
ciates need all firms to be bound to the same standards so that 
partners feel free from fear of losing business to competitors. 
Partners can use union requirements as a basis to go back to 
clients and insist on more reasonable working conditions, such 
as maximum hours in a given day or week. Contract and staff 
attorneys are virtually powerless today, so a union that unites 
all firm lawyers would beneficially serve their interest. 
  CONCLUSION   
Law firms are keystone fixtures of the legal and business 
communities. As such, they shape and drive the development of 
civil law and practice, the structure of companies, and the en-
forcement of important state and federal regulations. Law 
firms fund, staff, and support much of the profession’s charita-
ble, pro bono, and non-profit work. They employ thousands of 
lawyers throughout the world and have a strong voice in direct-
ing the legal profession.338 They aid in business development 
and are instrumental to the economy. If law firms work poorly, 
all of these areas are negatively affected. If law firms work 
well, benefits flow far beyond their walls. 
The application of new institutionalism to big law reveals 
that the ethical tensions present in law firms are structural 
and require structural solutions. How firms process work cre-
ates incentives and situations where ethical violations are more 
likely to occur and go unnoticed. New institutionalism explains 
that this is a structure that undermines an individual actor’s 
ability to remedy professional misconduct. Essentially, firm at-
torneys have internalized institutional norms that hinder their 




 338. See Lawyer Demographics, A.B.A., http://new.abanet.org/market 
research/PublicDocuments/Lawyer_Demographics.pdf ( last visited Apr. 16, 
2012) (illustrating that in 2000, seventy-four percent of U.S. lawyers worked 
in private practice and fourteen percent of those were employed by law firms 
with more than 100 lawyers, accounting for more than ten percent of all U.S. 
lawyers). The percentage rose between 2000 and 2007 as large law firms con-
tinued to grow and recruit a larger percentage of law graduates. The National 
Association of Law Placement reports that between 2001 and 2006 law firms 
recruited over fifty-five percent of all law graduates: large law firms with over 
100 lawyers recruited approximately forty percent of those graduates, account-
ing for an astonishing twenty-two percent of all graduates nationwide. See 
Trends in Graduate Employment—1985–2006, NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. PLACEMENT 
(July 2007), http://www.nalp.org/2007julgraduateemployment/. 
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This impotence extends throughout the chain-of-command, from 
partners to associates and beyond.  
Ultimately, the most effective solution to the ethical di-
lemmas this institutional culture raises is for private-sector at-
torneys to unionize, reform common labor practices in the sec-
tor, and restore a stronger sense of human dignity, pride, and 
professionalism in a core part of the legal community. In the 
current system, the private-sector attorney as an individual 
has very little control or real leverage over his or her own work 
product, working conditions and environment. Only a funda-
mental shift in the labor structure of the law firm and the 
norms of private practice will allow the parties involved to reset 
their corporate culture to one where every lawyer may fulfill 
their ethical duties without impediment. Not only do firm at-
torneys have a right to unionize, they may have an ethical obli-
gation to do so. 
